NL1034079C2 - Call card with double rotated voting code. - Google Patents

Description

Call card with double rotated voting code.

The invention relates to a calling card for elections or to indicate a preference in a referendum, which is also suitable for voting via the internet and provides a supplement to Dutch patent application No. 1033414 "Transparent election system with double voting rotation" filed by the applicant.

10 The best way to prevent, when eavesdropping on the PC, on which a voter wants to cast a vote or preference via the internet, the vote cast or preference can be traced, is to ensure that no information about this vote or preference is given. is present in the PC. It is an object of the present invention to provide for this by performing the double voice rotation, as described in the aforementioned Dutch patent application, with the aid of the calling card. The candidate number of the candidate to be chosen, or the preferred number of one or more choices in a referendum, is hereby replaced by a voting code which is rotated twice per decimal of the candidate number or the preferred number.

In addition to the advantage that no information about the candidate or preference to be chosen is present on the PC, it is also possible to suffice with less input by the voter, because the two offset values for the double vote rotation, as described in the aforementioned patent application, do not have to be entered and replaced with a simple voting code.

A further advantage is that the input of the voting code on the voter's PC can work with an 1034079 -2 application on an internet server and a standard browser on the voter's PC and, therefore, no program needs to be downloaded, such as is done with the tax return.

5 This also makes it possible to cast a vote on, for example, information kiosks at stations or in other public places.

In order to ensure that the individual parties involved in the production and printing of the calling cards do not have information with which a vote could be traced, the calling card according to the invention consists of two parts glued together, of which the voter can easily remove a portion so that information that was previously covered becomes visible.

Apart from the use of two parts glued together, this can of course also be achieved in another way, for instance by applying a scratch varnish or by printing the information from the outside through a closed envelope, as is often done when dispensing 20 PIN codes, whereby this information is only visible after the envelope has been opened.

The implementation and creation of the calling card according to the invention will be described in the following on the basis of a few figures, wherein the chosen coding with numbers and letters is fictitious and arbitrary and wherein the designation of the candidate to be selected or the designation of the preference of one or more choices in a referendum can be represented by one or more number (s), letter (s), icon (s) or a combination of these characters.

Figure 1 shows the front and the back side of part 1 of the calling card according to the invention, as it is manufactured by the printer.

Figure 2 shows the front and the back of part 2 of the calling card, as it is produced by the printer 5.

Figure 3 shows the front and the rear side of the glued together parts 1 and 2 of the calling card.

Figure 4 shows the front of the card, after the Anonymous ID identification number (AID) has been provided by the decoding server.

Figure 5 shows the front and back of the calling card as it is delivered to the election server.

Figure 6 shows the front and the back of the calling card after the Voter ID identification number (KID), the Name Address Residence (name and address) information, the table with rotated options, the password and corresponding bar codes have been applied.

Figure 7 shows the calling card as it is received by the voter in a window envelope.

Figure 8 shows the reverse side of the calling card after the strip showing the check digit, the rest of the table and the barcode of the random second rotation RnB is removed.

Figure 9 shows an example of a filled-in card, wherein the proxy strip has also been torn off for the polling station, so that a voting machine can possibly be released with the remaining barcodes.

The basic idea behind the invention is that if there is no traceable information regarding the vote cast or option available in the voter's PC and also not in the information sent over the internet, then compromising these parts no information -4- about the vote cast or option available.

The printer, who is instructed to print the calling cards, produces two rolls of printed, perforated-separated parts 1 and 2 of the calling card, of which only one is shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2.

The front side (1) of part 1 in figure 1 is the side where, after combining part 1 and part 2 into the final calling card, the name and address data of the voter will be printed. Part 1 is provided with the tear perforations (2), (3), (4) and (5). The back (6) of part 1 is provided with a unique check digit (7) and a table (8) with in the left part ten rows of numbers 0 to 9, which depending on the number of candidates or options for example in three decimal places columns are divided and rotated per decimal column with a random rotation. The decimal values of these second rotations are represented by a random number RnB (9), for example by indicating the first digit in each column in each column. The value of the second rotation RnB (9) thus obtained is also printed on the reverse side (6) of part 1 in both legible and barcode form.

Wherever barcode is used in the description, another machine-readable code can of course also be applied, such as, for example, dot code or codes for OCR (Optical Character Recognition). Also, with the exception of the rotation values, for example RFID 30 (Radio Frequent IDentification) can be used to automatically transfer information from the card.

In addition to the reverse side, both the check digit (7) and the second rotation number RnB (9) are also printed on the front side of part 1, both legibly and in barcode form, in the side edge or -5-info strip (10) , which is separated from the middle part of part 1 by perforation (2). This side edge or information strip (10) is later rolled up and stored as a physical control strip at the decoding server, 5 in order to be able to show what information is decoded by the decoding server on the call card is added. The unique check digit (7) serves to check after the election whether the vote cast is also in the polls and therefore counts in the election.

Moreover, each voter can calculate the election result on the basis of this information.

The front side (11) of part 2 of the calling card, as shown in Figure 2, later forms the rear side of the calling card, after the parts 1 and 2 have been glued to each other. This information is printed for the voter, such as for example the internet address on which a vote can be cast and instructions for casting such an internet vote. Part 2 contains tear perforations (12), (13) and (14) corresponding to the perforations (2), (3) and (4) of part 1, and a finger-shaped tear perforation (15). The table (8) from figure 1 is repeated on the front of part 2 in the form of a table (16) but then without filling anything in here. The rear side of part 2 is provided with an adhesive layer (17) which is activated when parts 1 and part 2 are joined together, for example by heating. This adhesive layer (17) covers the entire rear side of part 2 with the exception of the part that is located within the finger-shaped perforation (15) and a line corresponding to perforation (5) of figure 1. Below the adhesive layer (17) and within the finger-shaped perforation (15) a portion (18) is printed black or with black figures to prevent the table (8) from figure 1 and later the table (16) from being pushed through the calling card or the envelope 35 can be read.

-6-

After the parts 1 and 2 are ready, they are glued to each other as indicated in figure 3. The information from the table (8), the check digit (7) and the second rotation RnB (9) in figure 1 is therefore completely covered. and invisible. However, the check digit (7) and the second rotation RnB (9) on the front of the calling card can still be read in the side edge or info strip (19) which is later rolled up and stored as a physical check strip at the decoding server. Precise registration of the parts 1 and 2 can be done in known manner with the aid of optical means or optionally by providing a chain perforation (not shown) in advance on the sides of both parts.

The call cards then pass through perforations separated in roll form from the printer to the decoder server manager, who provides the cards with a unique AID (21). As indicated in Figure 4, this AID (21) is printed per call card in readable form and in the form of a barcode on the side edge or info strip (19) and on the other side edge or info strip (20). A file is also created in the decoding server, in which per AID (21) it is determined what the associated check digit (7) and the associated second rotation RnB 25 (9) is. Next, at the decoding server, the side edge or info strip (19) along the perforations (2) and (12) of Figures 1 and 2 is removed and as a physical check means for the link between the AID (21), the check digit (7) and the second rotation RnB (9) rolled up and stored.

The roll with call cards separated by perforations, the front and back of one of which is indicated in Figure 5, then goes to the election server administrator. On the outside of these cards, information about the control number (7), the second rotation RnB (9) and the information in the table (8) of Figure 1 in relation to the AID can no longer be observed. 21).

With the aid of the election server, the roll 5 with perforated calling cards is subsequently provided with information about the voter. For this purpose, as indicated in Figure 6, the name and address data of the voter are printed on the front of the calling card, both on the part (22) intended for the voter and on the part (23) intended for the polling station. A unique Voter Identification Number (KID) (24) and a random first rotation RnA (25) are also printed on the side edge or information strip (20), which indicates the rotation per decimal of the candidate number or choice number from, for example, the ten letters A to and with J printed on the back (26) of the caller card portion in the right-hand portion of the table (16). The value of the first rotation RnA (25) represents, for example, the position of the letter in the alphabet per 20 columns, starting with 0 for A. On this part, the KID (24), the first rotation RnA (25) and a password (29) printed for the voter, both in readable form and in barcode form. The KID (24) and the name and address details of the voter are also printed on the back (27) of the part of the calling card intended for the polling station. A file is also created in the election server, in which per KID (24) it is determined what the associated AID (21) and the associated first rotation RnA (25) is.

Subsequently, the side edge (20) is removed and rolled up and stored at the election server as a physical control means, in order to be able to demonstrate what information has been added to the call card by the election server. This is the link between AID (21), KID

-8- (24) and the associated first rotation RnA (25).

After the side edge or information strip (20) has been removed and rolled up along the perforations (3) and (14) of Figures 1 and 2, the calling cards are individually separated from the roll along the perforations (28) and packaged as indicated in Figure 7. in a window envelope. At the front of the calling card, through the window of the envelope, besides possibly some general information, only name and address information from the voter can now be seen.

The voter who wants to vote via the internet takes the calling card and removes, as indicated in figure 8, along the finger-shaped perforation (15) and along perforation (5) the non-glued part, so that the check digit (7), the second rotation RnB (9) and the rest of the table (8) becomes visible. By entering the number of the candidate or choice number at the top of the table, as indicated in the example of Figure 9, the corresponding voting code can be taken from the table and entered at the bottom. With the help of the KID (24) and the password (29) the voter can then register with the election server and cast his or her vote or choice by entering the relevant voting code. Because no information about the rotations applied on the voter's PC is known, it is not possible to trace the vote or choice actually cast on the basis of the voting code.

30 If a voter decides to go to a polling station, the barcode information of the first rotation RnA (25), the second rotation RnB (9), KID (24) and the password (29) can become the voting machine released and a vote or choice be cast in the conventional manner. The corresponding voting code can then be calculated by the voting machine and passed on to the election server, so that the voter can check his or her vote or choice in the same way as with an internet vote on the basis of the check digit (7) also counts in the ballot box.

If voting is done by proxy, this can only be done at a polling station. The proxy giver gives the slip (27) with a signature to the proxy holder. With this, after the name and address information 10 of the proxy holder has been entered and a signature has been placed, he can cast a vote or choice at the polling station. Upon casting this vote or choice, the first rotation RnA and the second rotation RnB of the proxy holder himself are used to encrypt the vote or choice and send it to the election server. The publication of the vote or choice cast on the internet, however, takes place under the control number of the proxy giver, so that he can also check the vote or choice cast.

20 By not showing or giving the part (26) intended for the voter to the proxy holder, the proxy holder cannot cast a vote or make a choice via the Internet, because the required password is missing. The rotations of the tables (8) and (16) of figures 1 and 6 respectively are also missing, so that the proxy holder does not know which voting code is to be used for which vote or choice.

1 034079

Claims (12)

1. A calling card with which a vote can be cast via the internet with the aid of a double-rotated voting code, characterized in that this double rotation is indicated per decimal of a candidate number or preferred number on the calling card, so that in a simple manner on the basis of the candidate number or preferred number and this double rotation mentioned, a voting code can be derived by the voter on the calling card, which can be entered into the voter's PC and transmitted via the internet and which represents the vote cast by the voter concerned, without that information is present or sent in the voter's PC or via the internet, from which the vote cast can be traced on the basis of this voting code. 2. A calling card with a double-rotated voting code according to the preceding claim, characterized in that the input of the voting code can be done with an application on an internet server and a standard browser on the PC of the voter and therefore no program has to be downloaded . 25 A calling card with a double-rotated voting code as claimed in one or both of the preceding claims, characterized in that it is also possible to vote for information kiosks, for example at stations or in other public places. 30 1034079 4. A calling card with double-rotated voting code according to one or more preceding claim (s), characterized in that the calling card consists of two parts glued together, of which the voter can easily remove a part, so that information that was first covered becomes visible, to prevent that the individual parties involved in the production and printing of the calling cards have no information with which a vote could be traced. 10 A call card with double-rotated voting code according to the preceding claim, characterized in that instead of two parts glued to each other, use is made of a scratch varnish to cover information. 15 6. A calling card with a double-rotated voting code according to claim 4, characterized in that, instead of two parts glued together, information to be covered by a closed envelope is printed and only becomes visible after the envelope has been opened. 7. A calling card with double rotated voting code according to one or more preceding claim (s), characterized in that the indication of the candidate to be chosen or the indication of the preference of one or more choices in a referendum is represented by one or more digits (s), letter (s), ico (ies) or a combination of these characters. 30-12 8. A calling card with double-rotated voting code according to one or more preceding claim (s), characterized in that the rotations in the decimal columns of the vote to be cast or option are represented by a number, for example per decimal column successively the first digit of this column. 9. A calling card with double-rotated voting code according to one or more preceding claim (s), characterized in that the calling card is provided with two side edges or information strips, which are respectively provided by the decoding server and by the election server of information relevant to the relevant server. and are stored as a physical check strip at the relevant server in order to be able to demonstrate what information these relevant servers have added to the calling card. 10. A calling card with double-rotated voting code according to one or more preceding claim (s), characterized in that at least one of the parts 1 and 2 of the calling card is printed partly black or with black figures on the glued together side, in order to prevent the covered information from being read through the calling card or through the envelope. 11. A calling card with a double-rotated voting code according to one or more preceding claim (s), characterized in that the calling card is provided with a strip with which proxy voting can take place at a polling station, wherein for determining the voting code use is made of the double rotation of the proxy-holder and whereby the proxy-giver can possibly check via internet whether the agreed vote or option 5 has actually been cast. 12. A calling card with a double-rotated voting code as claimed in one or more of the preceding claims, characterized in that relevant information is present on the calling card in addition to being readable, also in machine-readable form, such as, for example, in the form of barcode or radio frequency readable code . 1034079