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Misrepresentation in Context

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Abstract

We can witness the recent surge of interest in the interaction between cognitive science, philosophy of science, and aesthetics on the problem of representation. This naturally leads us to rethinking the achievements of Goodman’s monumental book Languages of Art. For, there is no doubt that no one else contributed more than Goodman to throw a light on the cognitive function of art. Ironically, it could be also Goodman who has been the stumbling block for a unified theory of representation. In this paper, I shall contrast the ways how differently misrepresentation has been treated in cognitive science, aesthetics, and philosophy of science. And I shall show that it is Goodman’s unnecessary separation of resemblance and representation in art that made such a difference. As a conclusion, I will indicate some of the most promising projects toward the unified theory of representation the revolt against Goodman’s rejection of resemblance theories might promise to us.

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Notes

  1. Fodor (1986, 1987), Barwise (1986, 1989). Fodor thinks that the theory of information held by Dretske and articulated by Barwise and Perry treats the information content of a situation as the basic notion. In this theory, the information content is non-perspectival, receiver neutral, intrinsic, and non-intentional. On the other hand, he claims, what are needed in cognitive science are the notions of information displayed by a signal, the information encoded by the signal, and the information in the signal that is available to the agent. They are perspectival, receiver relative, non-intrinsic, and intentional. Barwise sensitively responds to such a characterization of their theory, especially as behavioristic. He also launches a counterattack on Fodor’s ideas of lingua mentis, which is not our present concern.

  2. Interestingly, Fodor becomes more and more favorable to the possibility of the information-based theory of meaning. In particular, he seems to withdraw his criticism formulated as the naturalization problem (Fodor 1990, 131, n. 3). Be that as it may, the naturalization problem is not our current concern.

  3. I mistakenly claimed that the relevance of resemblance to representation is simply taken for granted in philosophy of science. But such a claim is “misleading in the sense that theories of verisimilitude explicitly define similarity relations between states of affairs or possible worlds and explicitly analyze case studies of misrepresenting idealizations”. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for this point.

  4. Of the two analogies he has in mind, I am going to discuss only the first one, which concerns abstraction and idealization in science.

  5. Chakravartty uses Stathis Psillos’ summary as a point of departure: “A description D ... is approximately true of [a state] S if there is another state S’ such that S and S’ are linked by specific conditions of approximation, and D ... is true of S”’ [ibid., p. 34; Psillos 1999, p. 277].

  6. We already noted that at a crucial point Perini is indebted to File’s distinction. And, so is Newall (2010, 102, n. 4). So, it seems advisable to grant a fair hearing to Files for the reasons why we need to criticize and modify Goodman’s rejection of resemblance theory.

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  1. Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, College of Cultural Science, KAIST, 373-1 Guseong Dong, Yuseong Gu, Daejeon, 305-701, South Korea

    Woosuk Park

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Park, W. Misrepresentation in Context. Found Sci 19, 363–374 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-014-9345-3

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