Abstract
This article studies the dominance solvability (by iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies) of general scoring rule voting games when there are three alternatives. The scoring rules we study include Plurality rule, Approval voting, Borda rule, and Relative Utilitarianism. We provide sufficient conditions for dominance solvability of general scoring rule voting games. The sufficient conditions that we provide for dominance solvability are in terms of one statistic of the game: sufficient agreement on the best alternative or on the worst alternative. We also show that the solutions coincide with the set of Condorcet Winners whenever the sufficient conditions for dominance solvability are satisfied. Approval Voting performs the best in terms of our criteria.
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Buenrostro, L., Dhillon, A. & Vida, P. Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability. Soc Choice Welf 40, 329–352 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0602-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0602-x