Abstract
A problem with the concept of the core is that it does not explicitly capture the credibility of blocking coalitions. This notion is defined, and the concept of a modified core introduced, consisting of allocations not blocked by any credible coalition. The core and modified core are then shown to be identical. The concept of credibility is thus implicit in the definition of the core.
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I am grateful to Kenneth Arrow, Doug Bernheim, Peter Hammond and Yair Tauman for helpful comments. I was affiliated to the Department of Economics, Stanford University, when this note was originally written in 1983.
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Ray, D. Credible coalitions and the core. Int J Game Theory 18, 185–187 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01268157
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01268157