Talk Overview
General positive results for secure computation were obtained more than two decades ago. These results were for the setting where each protocol execution is done in isolation. With the proliferation of the network setting (and especially the internet), an ambitious effort to generalize these results and obtain concurrently secure protocols was started. However it was soon shown that designing secure protocols in the concurrent setting is unfortunately impossible in general. In this talk, we will first describe the so called chosen protocol attack. This is an explicit attack which establishes general impossibility of designing secure protocols in the concurrent setting. The negative results hold for the so called plain model where there is no trusted party, no honest majority, etc.
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© 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Goyal, V. (2011). Secure Composition of Cryptographic Protocols. In: Jajodia, S., Mazumdar, C. (eds) Information Systems Security. ICISS 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7093. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25560-1_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25560-1_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-25559-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-25560-1
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