Abstract
In ASIACCS’08, Burmester, Medeiros and Motta proposed an anonymous RFID authentication protocol (BMM protocol [2]) that preserves the security and privacy properties, and achieves better scalability compared with other contemporary approaches. We analyze BMM protocol and find that some of security properties (especial untraceability) are not fulfilled as originally claimed. We consider a subtle attack, in which an adversary can manipulate the messages transmitted between a tag and a reader for several continuous protocol runs, and can successfully trace the tag after these interactions. Our attack works under a weak adversary model, in which an adversary can eavesdrop, intercept and replay the protocol messages, while stronger assumptions such as physically compromising of the secret on a tag, are not necessary. Based on our attack, more advanced attacking strategy can be designed on cracking a whole RFID-enabled supply chain if BMM protocol is implemented. To counteract such flaw, we improve the BMM protocol so that it maintains all the security and efficiency properties as claimed in [2].
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Avoine, G., Oechslin, P.: A scalable and provably secure hash-based RFID protocol. In: Third IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops, 2005. PerCom 2005 Workshops, pp. 110–114 (2005)
Burmester, M., de Medeiros, B., Motta, R.: Robust, anonymous RFID authentication with constant key-lookup. In: ASIACCS 2008: Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security, pp. 283–291. ACM, New York (2008)
Chatmon, C., van Le, T., Burmester, M.: Secure anonymous RFID authentication protocols. Technical Report TR-060112 (2006)
Czeskis, A., Koscher, K.: RFIDs and secret handshakes: defending against ghost-and-leech attacks and unauthorized reads with context-aware communications. In: Conference on Computer and Communications Security – ACM CCS, October 2008. ACM Press, New York (2008)
Dimitriou, T.: A Lightweight RFID Protocol to protect against Traceability and Cloning attacks. In: Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communication Networks – SecureComm, Athens, Greece, September 2005. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2005)
Dimitriou, T.: A secure and efficient RFID protocol that could make big brother (partially) obsolete. In: IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications, pp. 269–275 (2006)
Goldreich, O., Goldwasser, S., Micali, S.: How to construct random functions. J. ACM 33(4), 792–807 (1986)
Juels, A.: RFID Security and Privacy: A Research Survey. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications 24(2), 381–394 (2006)
Juels, A., Pappu, R., Parno, B.: Unidirectional Key Distribution Across Time and Space with Applications to RFID Security. In: 17th USENIX Security Symposium, San Jose, CA, USA, July 2008, pp. 75–90. USENIX (2008)
Lim, T.-L., Li, T., Gu, T.: Secure rfid identification and authentication with triggered hash chain variants. In: ICPADS 2008: Proceedings of the 2008 14th IEEE International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems, Washington, DC, USA, pp. 583–590. IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos (2008)
Molnar, D., Soppera, A., Wagner, D.: A Scalable, Delegatable Pseudonym Protocol Enabling Ownership Transfer of RFID Tags. In: Preneel, B., Tavares, S. (eds.) SAC 2005. LNCS, vol. 3897, pp. 276–290. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
Molnar, D., Wagner, D.: Privacy and Security in Library RFID: Issues, Practices, and Architectures. In: Pfitzmann, B., Liu, P. (eds.) Conference on Computer and Communications Security – ACM CCS, Washington, DC, USA, October 2004, pp. 210–219. ACM Press, New York (2004)
Ohkubo, M., Suzuki, K., Kinoshita, S.: Cryptographic Approach to “Privacy-Friendly” Tags. In: RFID Privacy Workshop, November 2003. MIT, MA (2003)
Rieback, M., Crispo, B., Tanenbaum, A.: RFID Guardian: A Battery-Powered Mobile Device for RFID Privacy Management. In: Boyd, C., González Nieto, J.M. (eds.) ACISP 2005. LNCS, vol. 3574, pp. 184–194. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
Rieback, M., Crispo, B., Tanenbaum, A.: The Evolution of RFID Security. IEEE Pervasive Computing 5(1), 62–69 (2006)
Rotter, P.: A Framework for Assessing RFID System Security and Privacy Risks. IEEE Pervasive Computing 7(2), 70–77 (2008)
Tsudik, G.: YA-TRAP: Yet Another Trivial RFID Authentication Protocol. In: International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications – PerCom 2006, Pisa, Italy, March 2006. IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos (2006)
Weis, S., Sarma, S., Rivest, R., Engels, D.: Security and Privacy Aspects of Low-Cost Radio Frequency Identification Systems. In: Hutter, D., Müller, G., Stephan, W., Ullmann, M. (eds.) Security in Pervasive Computing. LNCS, vol. 2802, pp. 454–469. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Liang, B., Li, Y., Ma, C., Li, T., Deng, R. (2009). On the Untraceability of Anonymous RFID Authentication Protocol with Constant Key-Lookup. In: Prakash, A., Sen Gupta, I. (eds) Information Systems Security. ICISS 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5905. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10772-6_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10772-6_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-10771-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-10772-6
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)