Abstract
In electronic voting, we say that a protocol has cast-as-intended verifiability if the contents of each encrypted vote can be audited in order to ensure that they match the voter’s selections. It is traditionally thought that this verification can only be performed by the voter who casts the vote, since only she knows the content of her vote. In this work, we show that this is not the case: we present the first cast-as-intended verification mechanism which is universally verifiable, i.e., the first protocol in which anyone (the voter herself or another party) can check that the contents of an encrypted vote match the voter’s selections. To achieve this goal, we assume the existence of a trusted registrar. We formally define universal cast-as-intended verifiability and we show that our protocol satisfies such property, while also satisfying ballot privacy. We give a general construction of the protocol and an efficient instantiation which is provably secure in the random oracle model. We also present a voting system which can be implemented on top of the voting protocol, which is intended to present a more intuitive process to the voter.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Adida, B.: Helios: web-based open-audit voting. In: van Oorschot, P.C. (ed.) USENIX Security Symposium, pp. 335–348. USENIX Association, Berkeley (2008)
Adida, B., Rivest, R.L.: Scratch and vote: self-contained paper-based cryptographic voting. In: Juels, A., Winslett, M. (eds.) ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society, WPES 2006, pp. 29–40. ACM (2006)
Benaloh, J.: Simple verifiable elections. In: Electronic Voting Technology Workshop, EVT 2006, p. 5. USENIX Association, Berkeley (2006)
Bernhard, D., Cortier, V., Galindo, D., Pereira, O., Warinschi, B.: SoK: a comprehensive analysis of game-based ballot privacy definitions. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2015, pp. 499–516. IEEE Computer Society (2015)
Bernhard, D., Pereira, O., Warinschi, B.: IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
Bohli, J.-M., Müller-Quade, J., Röhrich, S.: Bingo voting: secure and coercion-free voting using a trusted random number generator. In: Alkassar, A., Volkamer, M. (eds.) VOTE-ID 2007. LNCS, vol. 4896, pp. 111–124. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)
Chaum, D.: Physical and digital secret ballot systems, WO Patent App. PCT/US2001/002,883, 2 August 2001
Chaum, D.: Secret-ballot receipts: true voter-verifiable elections. IEEE Secur. Privac. 2(1), 38–47 (2004)
Chaum, D., Pedersen, T.P.: Wallet databases with observers. In: Brickell, E.F. (ed.) CRYPTO 1992. LNCS, vol. 740, pp. 89–105. Springer, Heidelberg (1993)
Cramer, R., Damgård, I.B., Schoenmakers, B.: Proof of partial knowledge and simplified design of witness hiding protocols. In: Desmedt, Y.G. (ed.) CRYPTO 1994. LNCS, vol. 839, pp. 174–187. Springer, Heidelberg (1994)
Cramer, R., Gennaro, R., Schoenmakers, B.: A secure and optimally efficient multi-authority election scheme. In: Fumy, W. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1997. LNCS, vol. 1233, pp. 103–118. Springer, Heidelberg (1997)
Damgård, I.B.: Commitment schemes and zero-knowledge protocols. In: Damgård, I.B. (ed.) EEF School 1998. LNCS, vol. 1561, pp. 63–86. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)
Essex, A., Clark, J., Hengartner, U., Adams, C.: Eperio: mitigating technical complexity in cryptographic election verification. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive 2012, 178 (2012)
Feige, U., Shamir, A.: Witness indistinguishable and witness hiding protocols. In: 22nd Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 1990, pp. 416–426. ACM Press (1990)
Gerck, E., Neff, C.A., Rivest, R.L., Rubin, A.D., Yung, M.: The business of electronic voting. In: Syverson, P.F. (ed.) FC 2001. LNCS, vol. 2339, pp. 234–259. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
Gharadaghy, R., Volkamer, M.: Verifiability in electronic voting - explanations for non security experts. In: Krimmer, R., Grimm, R. (eds.) Electronic Voting. LNI, vol. 167, pp. 151–162. GI (2010)
Groth, J., Ostrovsky, R.: Cryptography in the multi-string model. J. Cryptol. 27(3), 506–543 (2014)
Joaquim, R., Ribeiro, C., Ferreira, P.: VeryVote: a voter verifiable code voting system. In: Ryan, P.Y.A., Schoenmakers, B. (eds.) VOTE-ID 2009. LNCS, vol. 5767, pp. 106–121. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
Neff, C.A.: Practical high certainty intent verification for encrypted votes (2004)
Ryan, P.Y.A., Bismark, D., Heather, J., Schneider, S., Xia, Z.: Prêt à voter: a voter-verifiable voting system. IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 4(4), 662–673 (2009)
Ryan, P.Y.A., Teague, V.: Pretty good democracy. In: Christianson, B., Malcolm, J.A., Matyáš, V., Roe, M. (eds.) Security Protocols 2009. LNCS, vol. 7028, pp. 111–130. Springer, Heidelberg (2013)
Sako, K., Kilian, J.: Receipt-free mix-type voting scheme. In: Guillou, L.C., Quisquater, J.-J. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 1995. LNCS, vol. 921, pp. 393–403. Springer, Heidelberg (1995)
Santis, A.D., Persiano, G.: Zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge without interaction (extended abstract). In: FOCS, pp. 427–436. IEEE Computer Society (1992)
Schnorr, C.-P., Jakobsson, M.: Security of signed elgamal encryption. In: Okamoto, T. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1976, pp. 73–89. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Shamir, A.: How to share a secret. Commun. ACM 22(11), 612–613 (1979)
Acknowledgements
Authors want to thank the Program Committe of the \(1^{\text {st}}\) Workshop on Advances in Secure Electronic Voting for their valuable comments, in particular for pointing out that some notion of UCIV may be achieved by adapting existing schemes such as Scratch & Vote or Pretty Good Democracy.
The work of the third and fourth authors is partially supported by project MTM 2013-41426-R of Spanish Ministry MINECO.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2016 International Financial Cryptography Association
About this paper
Cite this paper
Escala, A., Guasch, S., Herranz, J., Morillo, P. (2016). Universal Cast-as-Intended Verifiability. In: Clark, J., Meiklejohn, S., Ryan, P., Wallach, D., Brenner, M., Rohloff, K. (eds) Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9604. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53357-4_16
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53357-4_16
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-662-53356-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-662-53357-4
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)