Abstract
This chapter gathers together and sums up the recent work on technical and philosophical aspects of logics of evidence and truth (LETs) through a study of the logics LETF and LETK, including an application of the latter to the problem of abduction. LETF is a paracomplete and paraconsistent sentential logic equipped with a unary operator ∘ that divides the sentences of the language into two groups: one subjected to classical logic and the other subjected to the logic of first-degree entailment (FDE), also known as Belnap-Dunn four-valued logic. The chapter discusses the intuitive intended interpretation of LETF in terms of positive and negative evidence, and shows how LETF can be interpreted in terms of reliable and unreliable information. It then presents natural deduction systems, valuation semantics, and analytic tableau system for both LETF and LETK, which extends LETF with a classical implication connective. Finally, it shows how LETK and its first-order extension QLETK can be applied to the problem of abduction by means of tableaux that indicate possible solutions for abductive problems. The chapter also includes an appendix that contains some general remarks on valuation semantics, Kripke-style semantics for both LETF and LETK, and a probabilistic semantics for LETF.
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Rodrigues, A., Coniglio, M.E., Antunes, H., Bueno-Soler, J., Carnielli, W. (2022). Paraconsistency, Evidence, and Abduction. In: Magnani, L. (eds) Handbook of Abductive Cognition. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68436-5_27-1
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