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Jun Xiao

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Personal Details

First Name:Jun
Middle Name:
Last Name:Xiao
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pxi115
The above email address does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Jun Xiao to update the entry or send us the correct address or status for this person. Thank you.
http://www.junxiao1.com

Affiliation

Department of Economics
Faculty of Business and Economics
University of Melbourne

Melbourne, Australia
http://www.economics.unimelb.edu.au/
RePEc:edi:demelau (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers

Working papers

  1. Jun Xiao, 2012. "Asymmetric All-Pay Contests with Heterogeneous," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1151, The University of Melbourne.
  2. Jun Xiao, 2012. "Bargaining Order in a Multi-Person Bargaining Game," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1150, The University of Melbourne.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Jun Xiao, 2012. "Asymmetric All-Pay Contests with Heterogeneous," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1151, The University of Melbourne.

    Cited by:

    1. Letina, Igor & Liu, Shuo & Netzer, Nick, 2022. "Optimal Contest Design: Tuning the Heat," CEPR Discussion Papers 14854, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Xiao, Jun, 2018. "Equilibrium analysis of the all-pay contest with two nonidentical prizes: Complete results," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 21-34.
    3. Siegel, Ron, 2014. "Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 684-702.
    4. Ghazala Azmat & Marc Möller, 2018. "The Distribution of Talent Across Contests," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03263984, HAL.
    5. Chen Cohen & David Lagziel & Ofer Levi & Aner Sela, 2020. "All-Pay Auctions With Heterogeneous Prizes And Partially Asymmetric Players," Working Papers 2010, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    6. Julio González-Díaz & Ron Siegel, 2013. "Matching and price competition: beyond symmetric linear costs," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(4), pages 835-844, November.
    7. Olszewski, Wojciech & Siegel, Ron, 2020. "Performance-maximizing large contests," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(1), January.
    8. Ewerhart, Christian, 2017. "Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 195-211.
    9. Matthias Dahm, 2017. "All-Pay Auctions with Extra Prize: A Partial Exclusion Principle," Discussion Papers 2017-01, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    10. Mendel, Moritz & Pieroth, Ferdinand & Seel, Christian, 2019. "Your Failure is My Opportunity - Eff ects of Elimination in Contests," Research Memorandum 016, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    11. Dahm, Matthias, 2018. "Semi-targeted all-pay auctions: A partial exclusion principle," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 256-282.

  2. Jun Xiao, 2012. "Bargaining Order in a Multi-Person Bargaining Game," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1150, The University of Melbourne.

    Cited by:

    1. Derek J. Clark & Jean-Christophe Pereau, 2021. "Group bargaining in supply chains," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 25(3), pages 111-138, September.
    2. Maurya, Amit Kumar, 2018. "Bargaining order in multilateral bargaining with imperfect compliments," MPRA Paper 89583, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Johannes Münster & Markus Reisinger, 2021. "Sequencing Bilateral Negotiations with Externalities," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 096, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    4. Bedayo, Mikel & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2016. "Bargaining in endogenous trading networks," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 70-82.
    5. Chiu Yu Ko & Duozhe Li, 2020. "Decentralized One‐To‐Many Bargaining," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 61(3), pages 1139-1172, August.
    6. Chen, Ying & Zápal, Jan, 2022. "Sequential vote buying," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
    7. Amit Kumar Maurya & Shubhro Sarkar, 2013. "Bargaining order and delays in multilateral bargaining with asymmetric sellers," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2013-015, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
    8. Suchan Chae & Seho Kim, 2019. "The effects of third-party transfers in sequential anchored bargaining," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(1), pages 143-155, March.
    9. Soumendu Sarkar, 2017. "Mechanism design for land acquisition," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(3), pages 783-812, August.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 2 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (2) 2012-07-23 2012-07-23
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (2) 2012-07-23 2012-07-23

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