Tags: imcotton/swift-nio
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Avoid implicit conversion. (apple#566) Motivation: We were inadvertently doing an implicit integer conversion from ssize_t to unsigned int in our sendmmsg shim. This can sometimes generate warnings. The conversion itself is safe. Modifications: Make the conversion explicit. Result: No warnings. (cherry picked from commit 131f378)
Avoid implicit conversion. (apple#566) Motivation: We were inadvertently doing an implicit integer conversion from ssize_t to unsigned int in our sendmmsg shim. This can sometimes generate warnings. The conversion itself is safe. Modifications: Make the conversion explicit. Result: No warnings. (cherry picked from commit 131f378)
security: ByteBuffer: fix heap buffer overflow on slice realloc Motivation: ByteBuffer had a very bad (exploitable!) security vulnerability if the following conditions are all true: - user writes to a ByteBuffer which is a slice (slice.lowerBound != 0) - the slice is uniquely referenced (ie. the buffer that it was sliced from is gone) - the write triggers a re-allocation Then the slice is actually _larger_ than the overall available capacity so another write to said ByteBuffer could end up out of bounds. Modifications: - fixed slice reallocation Result: - fixed security vulnerability
security: ByteBuffer: fix heap buffer overflow on slice realloc Motivation: ByteBuffer had a very bad (exploitable!) security vulnerability if the following conditions are all true: - user writes to a ByteBuffer which is a slice (slice.lowerBound != 0) - the slice is uniquely referenced (ie. the buffer that it was sliced from is gone) - the write triggers a re-allocation Then the slice is actually _larger_ than the overall available capacity so another write to said ByteBuffer could end up out of bounds. Modifications: - fixed slice reallocation Result: - fixed security vulnerability
security: ByteBuffer: fix heap buffer overflow on slice realloc Motivation: ByteBuffer had a very bad (exploitable!) security vulnerability if the following conditions are all true: - user writes to a ByteBuffer which is a slice (slice.lowerBound != 0) - the slice is uniquely referenced (ie. the buffer that it was sliced from is gone) - the write triggers a re-allocation Then the slice is actually _larger_ than the overall available capacity so another write to said ByteBuffer could end up out of bounds. Modifications: - fixed slice reallocation Result: - fixed security vulnerability
security: ByteBuffer: fix heap buffer overflow on slice realloc Motivation: ByteBuffer had a very bad (exploitable!) security vulnerability if the following conditions are all true: - user writes to a ByteBuffer which is a slice (slice.lowerBound != 0) - the slice is uniquely referenced (ie. the buffer that it was sliced from is gone) - the write triggers a re-allocation Then the slice is actually _larger_ than the overall available capacity so another write to said ByteBuffer could end up out of bounds. Modifications: - fixed slice reallocation Result: - fixed security vulnerability
security: ByteBuffer: fix heap buffer overflow on slice realloc Motivation: ByteBuffer had a very bad (exploitable!) security vulnerability if the following conditions are all true: - user writes to a ByteBuffer which is a slice (slice.lowerBound != 0) - the slice is uniquely referenced (ie. the buffer that it was sliced from is gone) - the write triggers a re-allocation Then the slice is actually _larger_ than the overall available capacity so another write to said ByteBuffer could end up out of bounds. Modifications: - fixed slice reallocation Result: - fixed security vulnerability
security: ByteBuffer: fix heap buffer overflow on slice realloc Motivation: ByteBuffer had a very bad (exploitable!) security vulnerability if the following conditions are all true: - user writes to a ByteBuffer which is a slice (slice.lowerBound != 0) - the slice is uniquely referenced (ie. the buffer that it was sliced from is gone) - the write triggers a re-allocation Then the slice is actually _larger_ than the overall available capacity so another write to said ByteBuffer could end up out of bounds. Modifications: - fixed slice reallocation Result: - fixed security vulnerability
security: ByteBuffer: fix heap buffer overflow on slice realloc Motivation: ByteBuffer had a very bad (exploitable!) security vulnerability if the following conditions are all true: - user writes to a ByteBuffer which is a slice (slice.lowerBound != 0) - the slice is uniquely referenced (ie. the buffer that it was sliced from is gone) - the write triggers a re-allocation Then the slice is actually _larger_ than the overall available capacity so another write to said ByteBuffer could end up out of bounds. Modifications: - fixed slice reallocation Result: - fixed security vulnerability
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