Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate

Judd B. Kessler and Alvin Roth

No 17324, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Organ donations from deceased donors provide the majority of transplanted organs in the United States, and one deceased donor can save numerous lives by providing multiple organs. Nevertheless, most Americans are not registered organ donors despite the relative ease of becoming one. We study in the laboratory an experimental game modeled on the decision to register as an organ donor, and investigate how changes in the management of organ waiting lists might impact donations. We find that an organ allocation policy giving priority on waiting lists to those who previously registered as donors has a significant positive impact on registration.

JEL-codes: C91 C92 D02 D71 I11 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
Note: EH
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published as Judd B. Kessler & Alvin E. Roth, 2012. "Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(5), pages 2018-47, August.

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Journal Article: Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate (2012)
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