[go: up one dir, main page]
More Web Proxy on the site http://driver.im/ Skip to main content
Springer Nature Link
Log in

Understanding institutional change: Fast-moving and slow-moving institutions

  • Articles
  • Published:
Studies in Comparative International Development Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This article proposes a classification of ‘slow-moving” and “fast-moving” institutions, and discusses the potential results of their interaction. A prime example of a slow-moving institution is culture, including values, beliefs, and social norms, which tend to change gradually. Political institutions are typically fast-moving institutions; exemplifying the nature of this category, political institutions do not necessarily change often but can change very quickly—sometimes nearly overnight. The interaction between slow-moving and fast-moving institutions can shed light on institutional change (why, how, and when it occurs), and evinces both the difficulty of transplanting institutions into different cultural contexts and the advantages of diverse institutional “blueprints” for efficient growth and development.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Subscribe and save

Springer+ Basic
£29.99 /Month
  • Get 10 units per month
  • Download Article/Chapter or eBook
  • 1 Unit = 1 Article or 1 Chapter
  • Cancel anytime
Subscribe now

Buy Now

Price includes VAT (United Kingdom)

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Acemoglu, D. 2002. “Why Not A Political, Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment and Politics.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. w9377.

  • Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. Robinson. 2001. “Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation.”American Economic Review 91: 1369–1401.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Acemoglu, D. and J. Robinson. 2000. “Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective.”Quarterly Journal of Economics 115: 1167–99.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Acemoglu, D. and J. Robinson. 2001. “A Theory of Political Transitions.”American Economic Review 91: 938–63.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Acemoglu, D. and J. Robinson. 2002. “Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. w8831.

  • Acemoglu, D. and J. Robinson.Political Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship. Unpublished manuscript.

  • Aoki, M. 2001.Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baron, D. 1998. “Comparative Dynamics of Parliamentary Government.”American Political Science Review 92: 593–610.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Berglöf, E. 1990. “Capital Structure as a Mechanism of, Control: A Comparison of Financial Systems.” InThe Firm as a Nexus of Treaties. Masahiko Aoki, Bo Gustavsson, and Oliver Williamson. eds. London: Sage Publications.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cai, H. and D. Treisman. “State Corroding Federalism: Interjurisdictional Competition and the Weakening of Central Authority.” UCLA Economics Online Paper No. 251. Los Angeles: University of California (forthcoming).

  • Che, J. and Y. Qian. 1998. “Insecure Property Rights and Government Ownership of Firms.”Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113, 2: 467–96.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dewatripont, M. and G. Roland. 1995. “The Design of Reform Packages under Uncertainty.”American Economic Review 85: 1207–23.

    Google Scholar 

  • Diamond, J. 1998.Guns, Germs and Steel. New York: Norton Publishing Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Diermeier, D., H. Eraslan, and A. Merlo. In press. “A Structural Model of Government Formation”.Econometrica.

  • Djankov, S. E. Glaeser, R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and, A. Shleifer. 2003. “The New Comparative Economics.”Journal of Comparative Economics (forthcoming).

  • Elster, J. 1982. “Marxism, Functionalism and Game Theory: The Case for Methodological Individualism.”Theory and Society 11, 4: 453–82.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Evans, P., 1989. “Predatory, Developmental and Other Apparatuses: A Comparative Political Economy Perspective on the Third World State.”Sociological Forum 4, 4: 561–87.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Finer, S.E. 2001.A History of Government from the Earliest Times. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gerschenkron, A. 1962.Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. New York: Praeger.

    Google Scholar 

  • Greif, A. 1993. “Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition.”American Economic Review 83, 3: 525–48.

    Google Scholar 

  • — 1994. “Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies.”Journal of Political Economy 102, 5: 912–50.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hough, J. 1988.Opening up the Soviet Economy. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kornai, J. 1995.Highways and Byways. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • — 1980.Economics of Shortage. Amsterdam: North-Holland Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 1998a. “Law and Finance.”Journal of Political Economy 106: 1113–55.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 1998b. “Legal Determinants of External Finance.”Journal of Finance 52: 1131–50.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 1999. “Corporate Ownership around the World.”Journal of Finance 54: 471–517.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 2000. “Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World.”Journal of Finance 55: 1–33.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lizzeri, A. and N. Persico. 2001. “The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives.”American Economic Review 91, 1: 225–45.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mayer, C. 1987. “The Assessment: Financial Systems and Corporate Investment.”Oxford Review of Economic Policy 3, 4: i-xvi.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Milesi-Ferretti, G-MA., R. Perotti, and Ma. Rostagno. 2002. “Electoral Systems and the Composition of Public Spending.”Quarterly Journal of Economics 117: 609–57.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Naughton, B. 1995.Growing Out of the Plan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • North, D. 1990.Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • North, D. and B. Weingast 1989. “Constitutions and Commitment: Evolutions of Institutions Governing Public Choice.”Journal of Economic History 49: 803–32.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Olson, M. 1971.The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Olson, M. 1982.The Rise and Decline of Nations. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Persson, T. and G. Tabellini. 1999. “The Size and Scope of Government: Comparative Politics with Rational Politicians.”European Economic, Review, Marshall Lecture 699–736.

  • Persson, T. Roland, and G. Tabellini 1997. “Separation of Powers and Political Accountability.”Quarterly Journal of Economics 112: 310–27.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini. 2000. “Comparative Politics and Public Finance.”Journal of Political Economy 108, 6: 1121–61.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini, 2003. “How do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structure, Forms of Government and Economic Policy?” PIER Conference on Political Economics working paper.

  • Przeworski, A., M. Alvarez, J. Cheibud, and F. Limongi. 2000.Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World. 1950–1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Qian, Y. 2002. “How Reform Worked in China.” William Davidson Institute Working Paper No. 473. Ann Arbor, MI: William Davidson Institute.

    Google Scholar 

  • Qian, Y., G. Roland, and C. Xu 1999. “Coordinating Changes in M-form and U-form Organizations.” William Davidson Institute Working Paper No. 284. Ann Arbor, MI: William, Davidson Institute.

    Google Scholar 

  • Qian, Y. and C. Xu 1993. “Why China’s Economic Reforms Differ: The M-Form Hierarchy and Entry/Expansion of the Non-State Sector.”Economics of Transition 1, 2: 135–170.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rodrik, D. 2000. “Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They Are and How to Acquire Them.”Studies in Comparative International Development 35, 3: 3–31.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roland, G. 1989.Economie politique du système soviétique. Paris: Editions de l’Harmattan.

    Google Scholar 

  • — 1991. “The Political Economy of Transition in the Soviet Union.”European Economy 49: 197–216.

    Google Scholar 

  • — 2000.Transition and Economics: Politics, Markets and Firms. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • — 2002. “Ten Years After … Transition and Economics.”IMF Staff Papers 48 (Special Issue): 29–52.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sachs, J. and W. Woo 1994. “Structural Factors in the Economic Reforms of China, Eastern Europe, and the Former Soviet Union.”Economic Policy 18: 102–45.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shleifer, A. and R. Vihny 1994. “Politicians and Firms.”The Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 4: 995–1025.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Weingast, B. 1995. “The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Growth.”Journal of Economics, Law and Organization 11: 1–31.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weitzman, M. and C. Xu 1993. “Chinese Township and Village Enterprises as Vaguely Defined Cooperatives.”Journal of Comparative Economics 3, 1: 276–308.

    Google Scholar 

  • Williamson, O. 1975.Markets and Hierarchies. New York: Free Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • — 1985.The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors
  1. Gérard Roland
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Additional information

Gérard Roland is, professor of economics at the University of California, Berkeley, serves as codirector of the Transition Economics Program of the Centre for Economic Policy Research, and is a William, Davidson Institute Fellow. Professor Roland’s most recent books includeBuilt to Last: A Political Architecture for Europe (co-edited with Erik Berglöf, Barry Eichengreen, Guido Tabellini, and Charles Wyplosz; Centre for Economic Policy Research 2003) andTransition and Economics: Politics, Markets and Firms (MIT Press 2000).

I am grateful to Erik Berglöf. Grigore Pop-Eleches, Thad Dunning, and especially Ruth Collier for very helpful comments. I also thank seminar participants at the World Bank.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Roland, G. Understanding institutional change: Fast-moving and slow-moving institutions. St Comp Int Dev 38, 109–131 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02686330

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02686330

Keywords

Search

Navigation