ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation

In multi-agent environments in which coordination is desirable, the history of play often causes lock-in at sub-optimal outcomes. Notoriously, technologies with significant environmental footprint or high social cost persist despite the successful ...

We study the efficiency of first-/second-price sequential multiunit auctions with two buyers and complete information. Extending the primal-dual framework for obtaining efficiency bounds to this sequential setting, we obtain tight price of anarchy bounds. ...

This article defines a general class of cooperative games for which the nucleolus is efficiently computable. This class includes new members for which the complexity of computing their nucleolus was not previously known. We show that when the minimum ...

The formal study of coalition formation in multi-agent systems is typically realized in the framework of hedonic games, which originate from economic theory. The main focus of this branch of research has been on the existence and the computational ...

The past few years have seen several works exploring learning economic solutions from data, including optimal auction design, function optimization, stable payoffs in cooperative games, and more. In this work, we provide a unified learning-theoretic ...