[go: up one dir, main page]
More Web Proxy on the site http://driver.im/ skip to main content
research-article

Cost Allocation for Less-Than-Truckload Collaboration via Shipper Consortium

Published: 01 May 2022 Publication History

Abstract

We study the problem of collaborative less-than-truckload (LTL) transportation in the form of a shipper consortium, which is operated by a third-party logistics provider (3PL) through a cross-dock/pooling network. The 3PL has responsibility for planning the combined loads prior to actual shipments, hiring and routing carriers to execute shipping, and allocating the cost to the shippers in the consortium. Shippers receive substantial cost savings from combined truckload shipments. However, achieving consolidation and realizing this benefit requires addressing two essential issues: (i) how to find an approximately optimal consolidation solution in a large network with many freights and (ii) how to determine a fair cost allocation rule among the shippers’ consolidated freights that ensures budget balance while minimally violating coalitional stability. Our work resolves these two issues. We formulate a time-space network flow model of the problem under both incremental and all-unit discount structures of LTL rates and propose a computationally efficient algorithm based on local search heuristics. We model the problem of allocating cost to the shippers as a cooperative game. We decompose and linearize the Lagrangian dual problem by using total unimodularity and concavity. We propose an efficiently computable cost allocation rule from the linearized dual models. The dual rule ensures stable cooperation but may have underallocation equal to a duality gap. To cover the underallocation, we further develop a budget covering procedure and define an ϵ-core allocation with desirable properties. Through extensive computational experiments, we find that the shipper consortium reduces total shipping costs by more than 40% in most cases; meanwhile, the ϵ-core allocation is typically in the core for small-scale networks while violating stability by at most 5% for large-scale networks and provides consolidated freights with more than 50% individual cost savings on average.

References

[1]
Agarwal R, Ergun Ö (2008) Mechanism design for a multicommodity flow game in service network alliances. Oper. Res. Lett. 36(5):520–524.
[2]
Agarwal R, Ergun Ö (2010) Network design and allocation mechanisms for carrier alliances in liner shipping. Oper. Res. 58(6):1726–1742.
[3]
Altan B, Özener OÖ (2019) Cost allocation mechanisms in a peer-to-peer network. Networks 73(1):104–118.
[4]
Arslan O, Archetti C, Jabali O, Laporte G, Speranza MG (2020) Minimum cost network design in strategic alliances. Omega 96:102079.
[5]
Basso F, D’Amours S, Rönnqvist M, Weintraub A (2019) A survey on obstacles and difficulties of practical implementation of horizontal collaboration in logistics. Internat. Transportation Oper. Res. 26(3):775–793.
[6]
Caleres (2007) How to configure cross-docks and pools. Accessed March 10, 2019, https://tms.caleres.com/html/help/webhelp/en/configuration/creat_cross_docks.htm.
[7]
CaseStack (2015) Collaborative freight consolidation programs. Accessed March 10, 2019, http://www.casestackconsolidation.com.
[8]
Chabot T, Bouchard F, Legault-Michaud A, Renaud J, Coelho LC (2018) Service level, cost and environmental optimization of collaborative transportation. Transportation Res. Part E: Logist. Transportation Rev. 110:1–14.
[9]
Cleophas C, Cottrill C, Ehmke JF, Tierney K (2019) Collaborative urban transportation: Recent advances in theory and practice. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 273(3):801–816.
[10]
Creemers S, Woumans G, Boute R, Beliën J (2017) Tri-vizor uses an efficient algorithm to identify collaborative shipping opportunities. Interfaces 47(3):244–259.
[11]
Croxton KL, Gendron B, Magnanti TL (2003) Models and methods for merge-in-transit operations. Transportation Sci. 37(1):1–22.
[12]
CT Logistics (2017) CT TranSaver program–shipping co-op. Accessed March 10, 2019, http://www.ctlogistics.com/services/shipping-co-op.
[13]
Diaby M, Martel A (1993) Dynamic lot sizing for multi-echelon distribution systems with purchasing, transportation price discounts. Oper. Res. 41(1):48–59.
[14]
Engevall S, Göthe-Lundgren M, Värbrand P (2004) The heterogeneous vehicle-routing game. Transportation Sci. 38(1):71–85.
[15]
Farvolden JM, Powell WB (1994) Subgradient methods for the service network design problem. Transportation Sci. 28(3):256–272.
[16]
Ferrell W, Ellis K, Kaminsky P, Rainwater C (2020) Horizontal collaboration: Opportunities for improved logistics planning. Internat. J. Production Res. 58(14):4267–4284.
[17]
Friesen DK, Langston MA (1986) Variable sized bin packing. SIAM J. Comput. 15(1):222–230.
[18]
Gansterer M, Hartl RF (2018) Collaborative vehicle routing: A survey. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 268(1):1–12.
[19]
Gansterer M, Hartl RF (2020) Shared resources in collaborative vehicle routing. TOP 28:1–20.
[20]
Gendron B, Gouveia L (2017) Reformulations by discretization for piecewise linear integer multicommodity network flow problems. Transportation Sci. 51(2):629–649.
[21]
Gillies D (1959) Solutions to general non-zero sum games. Tucker A, Luce R, eds. Contributions to the Theory of Games IV (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ), 47–83.
[22]
Göthe-Lundgren M, Jörnsten K, Värbrand P (1996) On the nucleolus of the basic vehicle routing game. Math. Programming 72(1):83–100.
[23]
Guajardo M, Rönnqvist M (2016) A review on cost allocation methods in collaborative transportation. Internat. Transportation Oper. Res. 23(3):371–392.
[24]
Guajardo M, Rönnqvist M, Flisberg P, Frisk M (2018) Collaborative transportation with overlapping coalitions. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 271(1):238–249.
[25]
Hezarkhani B, Slikker M, Van Woensel T (2016) A competitive solution for cooperative truckload delivery. OR Spectrum 38(1):51–80.
[26]
Hezarkhani B, Slikker M, Van Woensel T (2019) Gain-sharing in urban consolidation centers. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 279(2):380–392.
[27]
Houghtalen L, Ergun Ö, Sokol J (2011) Designing mechanisms for the management of carrier alliances. Transportation Sci. 45(4):465–482.
[29]
Inbound Logistics (2016) CaseStack, Inc.: Logistics planner profiles. Accessed March 10, 2019, http://www.inboundlogistics.com/cms/planner/2016/casestack-inc/.
[30]
Kaewpuang R, Niyato D, Tan PS, Wang P (2017) Cooperative management in full-truckload and less-than-truckload vehicle system. IEEE Transportation Vehicular Tech. 66(7):5707–5722.
[31]
Kimms A, Kozeletskyi I (2016) Core-based cost allocation in the cooperative traveling salesman problem. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 248(3):910–916.
[32]
Li Z, Bookbinder JH, Elhedhli S (2012) Optimal shipment decisions for an airfreight forwarder: Formulation and solution methods. Transportation Res. Part C: Emerging Tech. 21(1):17–30.
[33]
Lojistic (2019) How to calculate less-than-truckload LTL freight rates. Accessed March 10, 2019, https://www.lojistic.com/ltl-freight-rates.
[34]
Marinakis Y, Migdalas A, Pardalos PM (2008) Cost allocation in combinatorial optimization games. Pardalos PM, Migdalas A, Pitsoulis L, eds. Pareto Optimality, Game Theory and Equilibria (Springer, New York), 217–247.
[35]
Markakis E, Saberi A (2005) On the core of the multicommodity flow game. Decision Support Systems 39(1):3–10.
[36]
Nguyen C, Dessouky M, Toriello A (2014) Consolidation strategies for the delivery of perishable products. Transportation Res. Part E: Logist. Transportation Rev. 69:108–121.
[37]
Osicka O, Guajardo M, van Oost T (2020) Cooperative game-theoretic features of cost sharing in location-routing. Internat. Transportation Oper. Res. 27(4):2157–2183.
[38]
Özener OÖ, Ergun Ö (2008) Allocating costs in a collaborative transportation procurement network. Transportation Sci. 42(2):146–165.
[39]
Özener OÖ, Ergun Ö, Savelsbergh M (2013) Allocating cost of service to customers in inventory routing. Oper. Res. 61(1):112–125.
[40]
Pan S, Trentesaux D, Ballot E, Huang GQ (2019) Horizontal collaborative transport: Survey of solutions and practical implementation issues. Internat. J. Production Res. 57(15-16):5340–5361.
[41]
Poljak BT (1987) Introduction to Optimization, vol. 1 (Optimization Software, Inc., Publications Division, New York).
[42]
Ramaekers K, Verdonck L, Caris A, Meers D, Macharis C (2017) Allocating collaborative costs in multimodal barge networks for freight bundling. J. Transportation Geography 65:56–69.
[43]
Robinson A (2014) 5 best transportation management optimization practices utilizing strategic freight shipping. Accessed March 10, 2018, https://cerasis.com/2014/09/24/transportation-management-optimization/.
[44]
Robinson CH (2016) Assessing the 5 biggest LTL savings opportunities. Accessed March 10, 2018, https://www.chrobinson.com/en-US/Resources/White-Papers/.
[45]
Russell RM, Krajewski LJ (1992) Coordinated replenishments from a common supplier. Decision Sci. 23(3):610–632.
[46]
Shapley L (1971) Cores of convex games. Internat. J. Game Theory 1(1):11–26.
[47]
Shapley L, Shubik M (1966) Quasi-cores in a monetary economy with nonconvex preferences. Econometrica 34(4):805–827.
[48]
Terry L (2015) Collaborative distribution: Taking off the training wheels. Accessed March 10, 2019, http://www.inboundlogistics.com/cms/article/collaborative-distribution-taking-off-the-training-wheels/.
[49]
Tinoco SVP, Creemers S, Boute RN (2017) Collaborative shipping under different cost-sharing agreements. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 263(3):827–837.
[50]
Unishippers Global Logistics (2019) 5 factors that determine LTL shipping rates. Accessed March 10, 2019,https://www.unishippers.com/ublog/5-factors-determine-ltl-freight-shipping-rates/.
[51]
van Zon M, Spliet R, van den Heuvel W (2021) The joint network vehicle routing game. Transportation Sci. 55(1):179–195.
[52]
Vanovermeire C, Sörensen K (2014a) Integration of the cost allocation in the optimization of collaborative bundling. Transportation Res. Part E: Logist. Transportation Rev. 72(2):125–143.
[53]
Vanovermeire C, Sörensen K (2014b) Measuring and rewarding flexibility in collaborative distribution, including two-partner coalitions. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 239(1):157–165.
[54]
Vanovermeire C, Sörensen K, Van Breedam A, Vannieuwenhuyse B, Verstrepen S (2014) Horizontal logistics collaboration: Decreasing costs through flexibility and an adequate cost allocation strategy. Internat. J. Logist. Res. Appl. 17(4):339–355.
[55]
Wolsey LA (1998) Integer Programming, vol. 42 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York).
[56]
Yilmaz O, Savasaneril S (2012) Collaboration among small shippers in a transportation market. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 218(2):408–415.
[57]
Zhang W, Uhan NA, Dessouky M, Toriello A (2018) Moulin mechanism design for freight consolidation. Transportation Res. Part B: Methodological 116:141–162.
[58]
Zheng J, Gao Z, Yang D, Sun Z (2015) Network design and capacity exchange for liner alliances with fixed and variable container demands. Transportation Sci. 49(4):886–899.

Recommendations

Comments

Please enable JavaScript to view thecomments powered by Disqus.

Information & Contributors

Information

Published In

cover image Transportation Science
Transportation Science  Volume 56, Issue 3
May-June 2022
233 pages
ISSN:1526-5447
DOI:10.1287/trsc.2022.56.issue-3
Issue’s Table of Contents

Publisher

INFORMS

Linthicum, MD, United States

Publication History

Published: 01 May 2022
Accepted: 04 April 2021
Received: 23 December 2019

Author Tags

  1. collaborative logistics
  2. sharing economy
  3. less-than-truckload shipping
  4. cooperative game

Qualifiers

  • Research-article

Contributors

Other Metrics

Bibliometrics & Citations

Bibliometrics

Article Metrics

  • 0
    Total Citations
  • 0
    Total Downloads
  • Downloads (Last 12 months)0
  • Downloads (Last 6 weeks)0
Reflects downloads up to 19 Dec 2024

Other Metrics

Citations

View Options

View options

Media

Figures

Other

Tables

Share

Share

Share this Publication link

Share on social media