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Patent Protection, Complementary Assets, and Firms Incentives for Technology Licensing

Published: 01 February 2006 Publication History

Abstract

This paper analyzes the relationship between technology licensing and the effectiveness of patent protection. Using the 1994 Carnegie Mellon survey on industrial research and development (R&D) in the United States, we develop and test a simple structural model in which the patenting and licensing decisions are jointly determined. We find that increases in the effectiveness of patent protection increases licensing propensity, but only when the firm lacks specialized complementary assets required to commercialize new technologies. In contrast, for firms with specialized complementary assets, increases in patent effectiveness increase patenting propensity but reduce the propensity to license. We present systematic cross-industry empirical support for the proposition that intellectual property protection is a key determinant of the vertical boundaries of the firm and the market for technology but that its impact is mediated by a firms ownership of specialized complementary assets.

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            cover image Management Science
            Management Science  Volume 52, Issue 2
            February 2006
            156 pages

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            INFORMS

            Linthicum, MD, United States

            Publication History

            Published: 01 February 2006

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            1. complementary assets
            2. licensing
            3. patent

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