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Poking a Hole in the Wall: Efficient Censorship-Resistant Internet Communications by Parasitizing on WebRTC

Published: 02 November 2020 Publication History

Abstract

Many censorship circumvention tools rely on trusted proxies that allow users within censored regions to access blocked Internet content by tunneling it through a covert channel (e.g,. piggybacking on Skype video calls). However, building tools that can simultaneously (i) provide good bandwidth capacity for accommodating the typical activities of Internet users, and (ii) be secure against traffic analysis attacks has remained an open problem and a stumbling block to the practical adoption of such tools for censorship evasion.
We present Protozoa, a censorship-resistant tunneling tool featuring both high-performing covert channels and strong traffic analysis resistance. To create a covert channel, a user only needs to make a video call with a trusted party located outside the censored region using a popular WebRTC streaming service, e.g., Whereby. Protozoa can then covertly tunnel all IP traffic from unmodified user applications (e.g., Firefox) through the WebRTC video stream.
This is achieved by hooking into the WebRTC stack and replacing the encoded video frame data with IP packet payload, while ensuring that the payload of the WebRTC stream remains encrypted, and the stream's statistical properties remain in all identical to those of any common video call. This technique allows for sustaining enough throughput to enable common-use Internet applications, e.g., web browsing or bulk data transfer, and avoid detection by state-of-the-art traffic analysis attacks. We show that Protozoa is able to evade state-level censorship in China, Russia, and India.

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      CCS '20: Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
      October 2020
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      ISBN:9781450370899
      DOI:10.1145/3372297
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      1. WebRTC
      2. censorship circumvention
      3. traffic analysis

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