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Good markets (really do) make good neighbors

Author:

Scott Duke KominersAuthors Info & Claims

ACM SIGecom Exchanges, Volume 16, Issue 2

Pages 12 - 26

https://doi.org/10.1145/3331041.3331044

Published: 07 May 2019 Publication History

Abstract

This article gives a (very) brief exposition of what market design is, along with four examples of market design in action. Loosely themed after Robert Frost's poem "Mending Wall," the examples demonstrate ways in which market design can break barriers---physical, political, and/or metaphorical. Each example also illustrates one of four broader classes of ways that market design can create positive change: marketplace mechanism (re-)design, information provision, (re-)shaping the extensive margin, and market(place) creation.

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Cited By

Suryanarayana SSarne DKraus S(2022)Explainability in Mechanism Design: Recent Advances and the Road AheadMulti-Agent Systems10.1007/978-3-031-20614-6_21(364-382)Online publication date: 14-Sep-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-031-20614-6_21
Kominers STeytelboym A(2020) The Parable of the Auctioneer: Complexity in Paul R. Milgrom’s Discovering Prices Journal of Economic Literature10.1257/jel.2019150458:4(1180-1196)Online publication date: 1-Dec-2020
https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20191504
Abebe RBarocas SKleinberg JLevy KRaghavan MRobinson DHildebrandt MCastillo CCelis ERuggieri STaylor LZanfir-Fortuna G(2020)Roles for computing in social changeProceedings of the 2020 Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency10.1145/3351095.3372871(252-260)Online publication date: 27-Jan-2020
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3351095.3372871

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cover image ACM SIGecom Exchanges

ACM SIGecom Exchanges Volume 16, Issue 2

June 2018

63 pages

EISSN:1551-9031

DOI:10.1145/3331041

Editor:
Hu Fu
University of British Columbia

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Copyright © 2019 Author.

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

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Published: 07 May 2019

Published in SIGECOM Volume 16, Issue 2

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Cited By

Suryanarayana SSarne DKraus S(2022)Explainability in Mechanism Design: Recent Advances and the Road AheadMulti-Agent Systems10.1007/978-3-031-20614-6_21(364-382)Online publication date: 14-Sep-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-031-20614-6_21
Kominers STeytelboym A(2020) The Parable of the Auctioneer: Complexity in Paul R. Milgrom’s Discovering Prices Journal of Economic Literature10.1257/jel.2019150458:4(1180-1196)Online publication date: 1-Dec-2020
https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20191504
Abebe RBarocas SKleinberg JLevy KRaghavan MRobinson DHildebrandt MCastillo CCelis ERuggieri STaylor LZanfir-Fortuna G(2020)Roles for computing in social changeProceedings of the 2020 Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency10.1145/3351095.3372871(252-260)Online publication date: 27-Jan-2020
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3351095.3372871

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