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The Price of Fragmentation in Mobility-on-Demand Services

Published: 13 June 2018 Publication History

Abstract

Mobility-on-Demand platforms are a fast growing component of the urban transit ecosystem. Though a growing literature addresses the question of how to make individual MoD platforms more efficient, much less is known about the cost of market fragmentation, i.e., the impact on overall welfare due to splitting demand between multiple independent platforms. Our work aims to quantify how much platform fragmentation degrades the efficiency of the system. In particular, we focus on a setting where demand is exogenously split between multiple platforms, and study the increase in supply rebalancing costs incurred by each platform to meet this demand, vis-à-vis the cost incurred by a centralized platform serving the aggregate demand. We show under a large-market scaling, this Price-of-Fragmentation undergoes a phase transition, wherein, depending on the nature of the exogenous demand, the additional cost due to fragmentation either vanishes or grows unbounded. We provide conditions that characterize which regime applies to any given system, and discuss implications of these findings on how such platforms should be regulated.

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      cover image Proceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems
      Proceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems  Volume 2, Issue 2
      June 2018
      370 pages
      EISSN:2476-1249
      DOI:10.1145/3232754
      Issue’s Table of Contents
      Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

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      Association for Computing Machinery

      New York, NY, United States

      Publication History

      Published: 13 June 2018
      Published in POMACS Volume 2, Issue 2

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      Author Tags

      1. large-market scaling
      2. mobility on demand
      3. phase transition
      4. platform competition
      5. ridesharing

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      • (2024)A real-time cooperation mechanism in duopoly e-hailing marketsTransportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies10.1016/j.trc.2024.104598162(104598)Online publication date: May-2024
      • (2024)Platform integration in ride-sourcing markets with heterogeneous passengersTransportation Research Part B: Methodological10.1016/j.trb.2024.103041188(103041)Online publication date: Oct-2024
      • (2024)Truthful online double auctions for on-demand integrated ride-sourcing platformsEuropean Journal of Operational Research10.1016/j.ejor.2023.12.004317:3(737-747)Online publication date: Sep-2024
      • (2024)How shareable is your trip? A path-based analysis of ridesplitting trip shareabilityComputers, Environment and Urban Systems10.1016/j.compenvurbsys.2024.102120110(102120)Online publication date: Jun-2024
      • (2023)Multi-Level Service Coordination in a Ride-Sourcing MarketSSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.4636077Online publication date: 2023
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      • (2023)Understanding market competition between transportation network companies using big dataTransportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice10.1016/j.tra.2023.103861178(103861)Online publication date: Dec-2023
      • (2023)Introduction of ride-sourcing marketsSupply and Demand Management in Ride-Sourcing Markets10.1016/B978-0-443-18937-1.00013-9(1-23)Online publication date: 2023
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