abstract

Public Access

Optimal Multi-Unit Mechanisms with Private Demands

Authors:

Nikhil R. Devanur,

Nima Haghpanah,

Christos-Alexandros PsomasAuthors Info & Claims

EC '17: Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

Pages 41 - 42

https://doi.org/10.1145/3033274.3085122

Published: 20 June 2017 Publication History

PDF eReader

Abstract

We study a pricing problem that is motivated by the following examples. A cloud computing platform such as Amazon EC2 sells virtual machines to clients, each of who needs a different number of virtual machine hours. Similarly, cloud storage providers such as Dropbox have customers that require different amounts of storage. Software companies such as Microsoft sell software subscriptions that can have different levels of service. The levels could be the number of different documents you are allowed to create, or the number of hours you are allowed to use the software. Companies like Google and Microsoft sell API calls to artificial intelligence software such as face recognition, to other software developers. Video and mobile games are increasingly designed in such a way that one can pay for better access to certain features. Spotify and iTunes sell music subscription, and different people listen to different number of songs in a month. Cellphone service providers like AT&T and Verizon offer cellular phone call minutes and data. People have widely varying amounts of data consumption.

Supplementary Material

MP4 File (devanur.mp4)

Download
370.42 MB

References

[1]

Constantinos Daskalakis, Alan Deckelbaum, and Christos Tzamos. 2013. Mechanism Design via Optimal Transport. In Proceedings of the Fourteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC).

Digital Library

Google Scholar

[2]

Nikhil R Devanur, Nima Haghpanah, and Christos-Alexandros Psomas. 2017. Optimal Multi-Unit Mechanisms with Private Demands. arXiv preprint arXiv:1704.05027 (2017).

Google Scholar

[3]

Sergiu Hart and Philip J Reny. 2015. Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations. Theoretical Economics 10, 3 (2015), 893--922.

Crossref

Google Scholar

[4]

Leonid G Khachiyan. 1980. Polynomial algorithms in linear programming. U. S. S. R. Comput. Math. and Math. Phys. 20, 1 (1980), 53--72.

Crossref

Google Scholar

[5]

Roger B. Myerson. 1981. Optimal Auction Design. Mathematics of Operations Research 6, 1 (1981), 58--73.

Digital Library

Google Scholar

[6]

Kalyan T Talluri and Garrett J Van Ryzin. 2006. The theory and practice of revenue management. Vol. 68. Springer Science & Business Media.

Google Scholar

Cited By

View all

Brânzei SDerakhshan MGolrezaei NHan YOh ANaumann TGloberson ASaenko KHardt MLevine S(2023)Learning and collusion in multi-unit auctionsProceedings of the 37th International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems10.5555/3666122.3667097(22191-22225)Online publication date: 10-Dec-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3666122.3667097
Alaei SChawla SMakhdoumi AMalekian A(2023)Countering Value Uncertainty via Refunds: A Mechanism Design ApproachSSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.4561235Online publication date: 2023
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4561235
Lv HBei XZheng ZWu F(2023)Auction Design for Bidders with Ex Post ROI ConstraintsWeb and Internet Economics10.1007/978-3-031-48974-7_28(492-508)Online publication date: 31-Dec-2023
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48974-7_28
Show More Cited By

Index Terms

Optimal Multi-Unit Mechanisms with Private Demands
1. Theory of computation
  1. Theory and algorithms for application domains
    1. Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
      1. Algorithmic game theory
      2. Algorithmic mechanism design

Recommendations

On revenue maximization with sharp multi-unit demands

We consider markets consisting of a set of indivisible items, and buyers that have sharp multi-unit demand. This means that each buyer $$i$$i wants a specific number $$d_i$$di of items; a bundle of size less than $$d_i$$di has no value. We consider the ...
Simple, Credible, and Approximately-Optimal Auctions
EC '20: Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

We present a general framework for designing approximately revenue-optimal mechanisms for multi-item additive auctions. Our approach adapts the duality framework of Cai, Devanur and Weinberg (STOC 2016) and applies to both truthful and non-truthful ...
Robust mechanisms for risk-averse sellers
EC '10: Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce

The existing literature on optimal auctions focuses on optimizing the expected revenue of the seller, and is appropriate for risk-neutral sellers. In this paper, we identify good mechanisms for risk-averse sellers. As is standard in the economics ...

Comments

Please enable JavaScript to view thecomments powered by Disqus.

Information & Contributors

Information

Published In

EC '17: Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

June 2017

740 pages

ISBN:9781450345279

DOI:10.1145/3033274

General Chair:
Constantinos Daskalakis
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA
,
Program Chairs:
Moshe Babaioff
Microsoft Research, Israel
,
Hervé Moulin
University of Glasgow, UK

Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the Owner/Author.

Publisher

Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 20 June 2017

Check for updates

Author Tags

Qualifiers

Abstract

Funding Sources

Conference

EC '17

Sponsor:

SIGecom

EC '17: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

June 26 - 30, 2017

Massachusetts, Cambridge, USA

Acceptance Rates

EC '17 Paper Acceptance Rate 75 of 257 submissions, 29%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 664 of 2,389 submissions, 28%

Upcoming Conference

EC '25

Sponsor:
sigecom

The 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

July 7 - 11, 2025

Stanford , CA , USA

Contributors

Other Metrics

View Article Metrics

Bibliometrics & Citations

Bibliometrics

Article Metrics

6
Total Citations
View Citations
393
Total Downloads

Downloads (Last 12 months)68
Downloads (Last 6 weeks)11

Reflects downloads up to 09 Jan 2025

Other Metrics

View Author Metrics

Citations

Cited By

View all

Brânzei SDerakhshan MGolrezaei NHan YOh ANaumann TGloberson ASaenko KHardt MLevine S(2023)Learning and collusion in multi-unit auctionsProceedings of the 37th International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems10.5555/3666122.3667097(22191-22225)Online publication date: 10-Dec-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3666122.3667097
Alaei SChawla SMakhdoumi AMalekian A(2023)Countering Value Uncertainty via Refunds: A Mechanism Design ApproachSSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.4561235Online publication date: 2023
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4561235
Lv HBei XZheng ZWu F(2023)Auction Design for Bidders with Ex Post ROI ConstraintsWeb and Internet Economics10.1007/978-3-031-48974-7_28(492-508)Online publication date: 31-Dec-2023
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48974-7_28
Weinberg SZhou ZPennock DSegal ISeuken S(2022)Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanisms are not Locally-ImplementableProceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/3490486.3538334(875-896)Online publication date: 12-Jul-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3490486.3538334
Devanur NGoldner KSaxena RSchvartzman AWeinberg SBiró PHartline JOstrovsky MProcaccia A(2020)Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded AgentsProceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/3391403.3399454(193-256)Online publication date: 13-Jul-2020
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3391403.3399454
Fu HLiaw CLu PTang ZCzumaj A(2018)The value of information concealmentProceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms10.5555/3174304.3175467(2533-2544)Online publication date: 7-Jan-2018
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3174304.3175467

View Options

View options

PDF

View or Download as a PDF file.

PDF

eReader

View online with eReader.

eReader

Login options

Check if you have access through your login credentials or your institution to get full access on this article.

Cited By

Index Terms

Recommendations

On revenue maximization with sharp multi-unit demands

Simple, Credible, and Approximately-Optimal Auctions

Robust mechanisms for risk-averse sellers