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Content-based security for the web

Published: 26 September 2016 Publication History

Abstract

The World Wide Web has become the most common platform for building applications and delivering content. Yet despite years of research, the web continues to face severe security challenges related to data integrity and confidentiality. Rather than continuing the exploit-and-patch cycle, we propose addressing these challenges at an architectural level, by supplementing the web's existing connection-based and server-based security models with a new approach: content-based security. With this approach, content is directly signed and encrypted at rest, enabling it to be delivered via any path and then validated by the browser. We explore how this new architectural approach can be applied to the web and analyze its security benefits. We then discuss a broad research agenda to realize this vision and the challenges that must be overcome.

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cover image ACM Other conferences
NSPW '16: Proceedings of the 2016 New Security Paradigms Workshop
September 2016
113 pages
ISBN:9781450348133
DOI:10.1145/3011883
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

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  • ACSA: Applied Computing Security Assoc
  • The National Science Foundation
  • DELL
  • CISCO

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Publication History

Published: 26 September 2016

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Author Tags

  1. content-based security
  2. end-to-end encryption
  3. web security

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NSPW '16
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NSPW '16: New Security Paradigms Workshop 2016
September 26 - 29, 2016
Colorado, Granby, USA

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  • (2022)Interest Flooding Attacks in Named Data Networking: Survey of Existing Solutions, Open Issues, Requirements, and Future DirectionsACM Computing Surveys10.1145/353973055:7(1-37)Online publication date: 1-Jun-2022
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  • (2018)Cracking ShadowCrypt: Exploring the Limitations of Secure I/O Systems in Internet BrowsersProceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies10.1515/popets-2018-00122018:2(47-63)Online publication date: 20-Feb-2018
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