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A Case for Protecting Computer Games With SGX

Authors:

Zhiqiang LinAuthors Info & Claims

SysTEX '16: Proceedings of the 1st Workshop on System Software for Trusted Execution

Article No.: 4, Pages 1 - 6

https://doi.org/10.1145/3007788.3007792

Published: 12 December 2016 Publication History

Abstract

The integrity and confidentiality of computer games has long been a concern of game developers, both in preventing players from cheating and from obtaining unlicensed copies of the software. Recently, Intel released SGX, which can provide new security guarantees for software developers to achieve an unprecedented level of software integrity and confidentiality. To explore how SGX can protect a computer game in practice, in this paper we make a first step of exploring new ways to protect the integrity and confidentiality of game code and data, and in doing so we have developed a framework and design principles for integrating games with SGX. We have applied our framework to demonstrate how it can be used to protect a real world computer game.

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Cited By

Collins SPoulopoulos AMuench MChothia TSchrittwieser SIanni M(2024)Anti-Cheat: Attacks and the Effectiveness of Client-Side DefencesProceedings of the 2024 Workshop on Research on offensive and defensive techniques in the context of Man At The End (MATE) attacks10.1145/3689934.3690816(30-43)Online publication date: 19-Nov-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3689934.3690816
Mengascini AAurelio RPellegrino GLuo BLiao XXu JKirda ELie D(2024)The Big Brother's New Playground: Unmasking the Illusion of Privacy in Web Metaverses from a Malicious User's PerspectiveProceedings of the 2024 on ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3658644.3690249(2162-2176)Online publication date: 2-Dec-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3658644.3690249
Ishiguro JShinjo YSoyama A(2024)Controlled Copying of Persistent Data Between end Users' SGX Enclaves over an Untrusted Network2024 International Symposium on Parallel Computing and Distributed Systems (PCDS)10.1109/PCDS61776.2024.10743591(1-10)Online publication date: 21-Sep-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/PCDS61776.2024.10743591
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Published In

cover image ACM Conferences

SysTEX '16: Proceedings of the 1st Workshop on System Software for Trusted Execution

December 2016

54 pages

ISBN:9781450346702

DOI:10.1145/3007788

Copyright © 2016 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

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ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
USENIX Assoc: USENIX Assoc
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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 12 December 2016

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Refereed limited

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National Science Foundation

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Middleware '16

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ACM
USENIX Assoc

Middleware '16: 17th International Middleware Conference

December 12 - 16, 2016

Trento, Italy

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EuroSys '25

Sponsor:
sigops

Twentieth European Conference on Computer Systems

March 30 - April 3, 2025

Rotterdam , Netherlands

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Cited By

Collins SPoulopoulos AMuench MChothia TSchrittwieser SIanni M(2024)Anti-Cheat: Attacks and the Effectiveness of Client-Side DefencesProceedings of the 2024 Workshop on Research on offensive and defensive techniques in the context of Man At The End (MATE) attacks10.1145/3689934.3690816(30-43)Online publication date: 19-Nov-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3689934.3690816
Mengascini AAurelio RPellegrino GLuo BLiao XXu JKirda ELie D(2024)The Big Brother's New Playground: Unmasking the Illusion of Privacy in Web Metaverses from a Malicious User's PerspectiveProceedings of the 2024 on ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3658644.3690249(2162-2176)Online publication date: 2-Dec-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3658644.3690249
Ishiguro JShinjo YSoyama A(2024)Controlled Copying of Persistent Data Between end Users' SGX Enclaves over an Untrusted Network2024 International Symposium on Parallel Computing and Distributed Systems (PCDS)10.1109/PCDS61776.2024.10743591(1-10)Online publication date: 21-Sep-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/PCDS61776.2024.10743591
Anwar MZuo CYagemann CLin Z(2023)Extracting Threat Intelligence From Cheat Binaries For Anti-CheatingProceedings of the 26th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses10.1145/3607199.3607211(17-31)Online publication date: 16-Oct-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3607199.3607211
Paju AJaved MNurmi JSavimäki JMcGillion BBrumley B(2023)SoK: A Systematic Review of TEE Usage for Developing Trusted ApplicationsProceedings of the 18th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security10.1145/3600160.3600169(1-15)Online publication date: 29-Aug-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3600160.3600169
Will NMaziero C(2023)Intel Software Guard Extensions Applications: A SurveyACM Computing Surveys10.1145/359302155:14s(1-38)Online publication date: 17-Jul-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3593021
Wang YZhang ZHe NZhong ZGuo SBao QLi DGuo YChen XMeng WJensen CCremers CKirda E(2023)SymGX: Detecting Cross-boundary Pointer Vulnerabilities of SGX Applications via Static Symbolic ExecutionProceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3576915.3623213(2710-2724)Online publication date: 15-Nov-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3576915.3623213
Toffalini FPayer MZhou JCavallaro L(2022)Designing a Provenance Analysis for SGX EnclavesProceedings of the 38th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference10.1145/3564625.3567994(102-116)Online publication date: 5-Dec-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3564625.3567994
Zhao SLi MZhangyz YLin Z(2022)vSGX: Virtualizing SGX Enclaves on AMD SEV2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)10.1109/SP46214.2022.9833694(321-336)Online publication date: May-2022
https://doi.org/10.1109/SP46214.2022.9833694
Zheng WWu YWu XFeng CSui YLuo XZhou Y(2021)A survey of Intel SGX and its applicationsFrontiers of Computer Science: Selected Publications from Chinese Universities10.1007/s11704-019-9096-y15:3Online publication date: 1-Jun-2021
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s11704-019-9096-y
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