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Bridge: A Leak-Free Hardware-Software Architecture for Parallel Embedded Systems

Published: 04 November 2024 Publication History

Abstract

Embedded and Internet of Things (IoT) devices are increasingly ubiquitous and process increasingly sensitive data. As a result, such devices must uphold security in addition to functional safety to avoid unintended information leaks. To react this change of environment, developers deploy conventional mechanisms such as memory isolation and priority scheduling to achieve aforementioned goals. While such techniques are resilient against attacks that endanger a device's functional safety, they are less effective in maintaining security as they ignore information leaks through timing channels, such as through scheduling policy and implicit microarchitectural state. Recent advances in timing-safe systems, in turn, limit themselves to time-shared systems without parallelism. This is problematic in the face of responsiveness and real-time constraints which are often found in embedded devices.
This paper explores timing-safety in the space of parallel systems. We introduce Bridge, a new system architecture featuring multiple tasks with different security concerns that can execute in parallel without leaking information due to timing interference.

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cover image ACM Conferences
KISV '24: Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on Kernel Isolation, Safety and Verification
November 2024
34 pages
ISBN:9798400713019
DOI:10.1145/3698576
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution International 4.0 License.

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Published: 04 November 2024

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