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The Effect of Length on Key Fingerprint Verification Security and Usability

Published: 29 August 2023 Publication History

Abstract

In applications such as end-to-end encrypted instant messaging, secure email, and device pairing, users need to compare key fingerprints to detect impersonation and adversary-in-the-middle attacks. Key fingerprints are usually computed as truncated hashes of each party’s view of the channel keys, encoded as an alphanumeric or numeric string, and compared out-of-band, e.g. manually, to detect any inconsistencies. Previous work has extensively studied the usability of various verification strategies and encoding formats, however, the exact effect of key fingerprint length on the security and usability of key fingerprint verification has not been rigorously investigated. We present a 162-participant study on the effect of numeric key fingerprint length on comparison time and error rate. While the results confirm some widely-held intuitions such as general comparison times and errors increasing significantly with length, a closer look reveals interesting nuances. The significant rise in comparison time only occurs when highly similar fingerprints are compared, and comparison time remains relatively constant otherwise. On errors, our results clearly distinguish between security non-critical errors that remain low irrespective of length and security critical errors that significantly rise, especially at higher fingerprint lengths. A noteworthy implication of this latter result is that Signal / WhatsApp key fingerprints provide a considerably lower level of security than usually assumed.

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cover image ACM Other conferences
ARES '23: Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security
August 2023
1440 pages
ISBN:9798400707728
DOI:10.1145/3600160
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

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Association for Computing Machinery

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Publication History

Published: 29 August 2023

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Author Tags

  1. Authentication
  2. Device pairing
  3. End-to-end encryption
  4. Key fingerprint verification
  5. Out-of-band channel
  6. Secure messaging
  7. Security
  8. Signal safety number
  9. Usability
  10. WhatsApp security code

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