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Bidder Selection Problem in Position Auctions: A Fast and Simple Algorithm via Poisson Approximation

Published: 13 May 2024 Publication History

Abstract

In the Bidder Selection Problem (BSP) there is a large pool of n potential advertisers competing for ad slots on the user's web page. Due to strict computational restrictions, the advertising platform can run a proper auction only for a fraction k<n of advertisers. We consider the basic optimization problem underlying BSP: given n independent prior distributions, how to efficiently find a subset of k with the objective of either maximizing expected social welfare or revenue of the platform. We study BSP in the classic multi-winner model of position auctions for welfare and revenue objectives using the optimal (respectively, VCG mechanism, or Myerson's auction) format for the selected set of bidders. This is a natural generalization of the fundamental problem of selecting k out of n random variables in a way that the expected highest value is maximized. Previous PTAS results ([Chen, Hu, Li, Li, Liu, Lu, NIPS 2016], [Mehta, Nadav, Psomas, Rubinstein, NIPS 2020], [Segev and Singla, EC 2021]) for BSP optimization were only known for single-item auctions and in case of [Segev and Singla 2021] for l-unit auctions. More importantly, all of these PTASes were computational complexity results with impractically large running times, which defeats the purpose of using these algorithms under severe computational constraints.
We propose a novel Poisson relaxation of BSP for position auctions that immediately implies that 1) BSP is polynomial-time solvable up to a vanishingly small error as the problem size k grows; 2) there is a PTAS for position auctions after combining our relaxation with the trivial brute force algorithm. Unlike all previous PTASes, we implemented our algorithm and did extensive numerical experiments on practically relevant input sizes. First, our experiments corroborate the previous experimental findings of Mehta et al. that a few simple heuristics used in practice (e.g., Greedy for general submodular maximization) perform surprisingly well in terms of approximation factor. Furthermore, our algorithm outperforms Greedy both in running time and approximation on medium and large-sized instances, i.e., its running time scales better with the instance size.

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cover image ACM Conferences
WWW '24: Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2024
May 2024
4826 pages
ISBN:9798400701719
DOI:10.1145/3589334
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

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Publication History

Published: 13 May 2024

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Author Tags

  1. bidder selection
  2. position auctions
  3. submodular maximization

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  • Research-article

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  • Science and Technology Innovation 2030 ?New Generation of Artificial Intelligence? Major Project No.(2018AAA0100903), Innovation Program of Shanghai Municipal Education Commission, Program for Innovative Research Team of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics (IRTSHUFE) and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities
  • National Key R&D Program of China
  • NSFC

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WWW '24
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WWW '24: The ACM Web Conference 2024
May 13 - 17, 2024
Singapore, Singapore

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