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Transaction Fee Mechanism Design

Published: 18 July 2021 Publication History

Abstract

Demand for blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum is far larger than supply, necessitating a mechanism that selects a subset of transactions to include "on-chain" from the pool of all pending transactions. EIP-1559 is a proposal to make several tightly coupled changes to the Ethereum blockchain's transaction fee mechanism, including the introduction of variable-size blocks and a burned base fee that rises and falls with demand. These changes are slated for deployment in Ethereum's "London fork," scheduled for late summer 2021, at which point it will be the biggest economic change made to a major blockchain to date. The first goal of this paper is to formalize the problem of designing a transaction fee mechanism, taking into account the many idiosyncrasies of the blockchain setting (ranging from off-chain collusion between miners and users to the ease of money-burning). The second goal is to situate the specific mechanism proposed in EIP-1559 in this framework and rigorously interrogate its game-theoretic properties. The third goal is to suggest competing designs that offer alternative sets of trade-offs. The final goal is to highlight research opportunities for the EC community that could help shape the future of blockchain transaction fee mechanisms.

Cited By

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  • (2024)Who gets the Maximal Extractable Value? A Dynamic Sharing Blockchain MechanismProceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3635637.3663097(2171-2173)Online publication date: 6-May-2024
  • (2024)MEV Sharing with Dynamic Extraction RatesProceedings of the Workshop on Decentralized Finance and Security10.1145/3689931.3694910(1-10)Online publication date: 19-Nov-2024
  • (2024)Transaction Fee Mechanism DesignJournal of the ACM10.1145/367414371:4(1-25)Online publication date: 20-Jun-2024
  • Show More Cited By

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Information

Published In

cover image ACM Conferences
EC '21: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
July 2021
950 pages
ISBN:9781450385541
DOI:10.1145/3465456
Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the Owner/Author.

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 18 July 2021

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Author Tags

  1. blockchains
  2. cryptocurrencies
  3. ethereum
  4. mechanism design

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  • Extended-abstract

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EC '21
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Acceptance Rates

Overall Acceptance Rate 664 of 2,389 submissions, 28%

Upcoming Conference

EC '25
The 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
July 7 - 11, 2025
Stanford , CA , USA

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Cited By

View all
  • (2024)Who gets the Maximal Extractable Value? A Dynamic Sharing Blockchain MechanismProceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3635637.3663097(2171-2173)Online publication date: 6-May-2024
  • (2024)MEV Sharing with Dynamic Extraction RatesProceedings of the Workshop on Decentralized Finance and Security10.1145/3689931.3694910(1-10)Online publication date: 19-Nov-2024
  • (2024)Transaction Fee Mechanism DesignJournal of the ACM10.1145/367414371:4(1-25)Online publication date: 20-Jun-2024
  • (2024)Undetectable Selfish MiningProceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/3670865.3673485(1017-1044)Online publication date: 8-Jul-2024
  • (2024)Tiered Mechanisms for Blockchain Transaction FeesMathematical Research for Blockchain Economy10.1007/978-3-031-68974-1_1(1-26)Online publication date: 4-Dec-2024
  • (2024)Transaction Fee Mechanism for Order-Sensitive Blockchain-Based ApplicationsComputer Security. ESORICS 2023 International Workshops10.1007/978-3-031-54204-6_20(327-343)Online publication date: 1-Mar-2024
  • (2023)Blockchain Transaction Fee Forecasting: A Comparison of Machine Learning MethodsMathematics10.3390/math1109221211:9(2212)Online publication date: 8-May-2023
  • (2023)Towards Decentralized Adaptive Control of Cryptocurrency Liquidity via Auction2023 IEEE 43rd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS)10.1109/ICDCS57875.2023.00057(910-919)Online publication date: Jul-2023
  • (2022)Overseas Transaction Fees: Sending Money via Bitcoin vs. BanksZagreb International Review of Economics and Business10.2478/zireb-2022-002525:s1(65-83)Online publication date: 12-Dec-2022
  • (2022)Redesigning Bitcoin’s Fee MarketACM Transactions on Economics and Computation10.1145/353079910:1(1-31)Online publication date: 18-May-2022
  • Show More Cited By

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