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Verifying and enforcing network paths with icing

Published: 06 December 2011 Publication History

Abstract

We describe a new networking primitive, called a Path Verification Mechanism (pvm). There has been much recent work about how senders and receivers express policies about the paths that their packets take. For instance, a company might want fine-grained control over which providers carry which traffic between its branch offices, or a receiver may want traffic sent to it to travel through an intrusion detection service.
While the ability to express policies has been well-studied, the ability to enforce policies has not. The core challenge is: if we assume an adversarial, decentralized, and high-speed environment, then when a packet arrives at a node, how can the node be sure that the packet followed an approved path? Our solution, icing, incorporates an optimized cryptographic construction that is compact, and requires negligible configuration state and no PKI. We demonstrate icing's plausibility with a NetFPGA hardware implementation. At 93% more costly than an IP router on the same platform, its cost is significant but affordable. Indeed, our evaluation suggests that icing can scale to backbone speeds.

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cover image ACM Conferences
CoNEXT '11: Proceedings of the Seventh COnference on emerging Networking EXperiments and Technologies
December 2011
364 pages
ISBN:9781450310413
DOI:10.1145/2079296
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Published: 06 December 2011

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Author Tags

  1. NetFPGA
  2. consent
  3. default-off
  4. path enforcement

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  • (2024)PathSec: Path-Aware Secure Routing with Native Path Verification and Auditability2024 IEEE Conference on Network Function Virtualization and Software Defined Networks (NFV-SDN)10.1109/NFV-SDN61811.2024.10807493(1-7)Online publication date: 5-Nov-2024
  • (2024)A Lightweight Path Validation Scheme in Software-Defined NetworksIEEE INFOCOM 2024 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications10.1109/INFOCOM52122.2024.10621099(731-740)Online publication date: 20-May-2024
  • (2024)SR-SL: A Secure and Low-Cost Path Validation Based on SRv6ICC 2024 - IEEE International Conference on Communications10.1109/ICC51166.2024.10622407(4602-4607)Online publication date: 9-Jun-2024
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