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A Unilateral-to-Mutual Authentication Compiler for Key Exchange (with Applications to Client Authentication in TLS 1.3)

Author:

Hugo KrawczykAuthors Info & Claims

CCS '16: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

Pages 1438 - 1450

https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978325

Published: 24 October 2016 Publication History

Abstract

We study the question of how to build "compilers" that transform a unilaterally authenticated (UA) key-exchange protocol into a mutually-authenticated (MA) one. We present a simple and efficient compiler and characterize the UA protocols that the compiler upgrades to the MA model, showing this to include a large and important class of UA protocols. The question, while natural, has not been studied widely. Our work is motivated in part by the ongoing work on the design of TLS 1.3, specifically the design of the client authentication mechanisms including the challenging case of post-handshake authentication. Our approach supports the analysis of these mechanisms in a general and modular way, in particular aided by the notion of "functional security" that we introduce as a generalization of key exchange models and which may be of independent interest.

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Cited By

Fischlin MSanina OLuo BLiao XXu JKirda ELie D(2024)Fake It till You Make It: Enhancing Security of Bluetooth Secure Connections via Deferrable AuthenticationProceedings of the 2024 on ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3658644.3670360(4762-4776)Online publication date: 2-Dec-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3658644.3670360
Wei JChen XWang JSusilo WYou I(2023)Towards secure asynchronous messaging with forward secrecy and mutual authenticationInformation Sciences10.1016/j.ins.2023.01.052626(114-132)Online publication date: May-2023
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ins.2023.01.052
Brzuska CDelignat-Lavaud AEgger CFournet CKohbrok KKohlweiss M(2023)Key-Schedule Security for the TLS 1.3 StandardAdvances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 202210.1007/978-3-031-22963-3_21(621-650)Online publication date: 25-Jan-2023
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22963-3_21
Show More Cited By

Index Terms

A Unilateral-to-Mutual Authentication Compiler for Key Exchange (with Applications to Client Authentication in TLS 1.3)
1. Security and privacy
  1. Cryptography
    1. Key management
  2. Network security
    1. Security protocols

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cover image ACM Conferences

CCS '16: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

October 2016

1924 pages

ISBN:9781450341394

DOI:10.1145/2976749

General Chairs:
Edgar Weippl
SBA Research, Austria
,
Stefan Katzenbeisser
TU Darmstadt, CYSEC, Germany
,
Program Chairs:
Christopher Kruegel
University of California, Santa Barbara, USA
,
Andrew Myers
Cornell University, USA
,
Shai Halevi
IBM Research, USA

Copyright © 2016 ACM.

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Published: 24 October 2016

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CCS'16: 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

October 24 - 28, 2016

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CCS '16 Paper Acceptance Rate 137 of 831 submissions, 16%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 1,261 of 6,999 submissions, 18%

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Cited By

Fischlin MSanina OLuo BLiao XXu JKirda ELie D(2024)Fake It till You Make It: Enhancing Security of Bluetooth Secure Connections via Deferrable AuthenticationProceedings of the 2024 on ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3658644.3670360(4762-4776)Online publication date: 2-Dec-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3658644.3670360
Wei JChen XWang JSusilo WYou I(2023)Towards secure asynchronous messaging with forward secrecy and mutual authenticationInformation Sciences10.1016/j.ins.2023.01.052626(114-132)Online publication date: May-2023
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ins.2023.01.052
Brzuska CDelignat-Lavaud AEgger CFournet CKohbrok KKohlweiss M(2023)Key-Schedule Security for the TLS 1.3 StandardAdvances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 202210.1007/978-3-031-22963-3_21(621-650)Online publication date: 25-Jan-2023
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22963-3_21
Davis HDiemert DGünther FJager T(2022)On the Concrete Security of TLS 1.3 PSK ModeAdvances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 202210.1007/978-3-031-07085-3_30(876-906)Online publication date: 30-May-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-031-07085-3_30
Diemert DJager T(2021)On the Tight Security of TLS 1.3: Theoretically Sound Cryptographic Parameters for Real-World DeploymentsJournal of Cryptology10.1007/s00145-021-09388-x34:3Online publication date: 4-Jun-2021
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-021-09388-x
Dowling BFischlin MGünther FStebila D(2021)A Cryptographic Analysis of the TLS 1.3 Handshake ProtocolJournal of Cryptology10.1007/s00145-021-09384-134:4Online publication date: 30-Jul-2021
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-021-09384-1
Akhmetzyanova LAlekseev ESmyshlyaeva ESokolov A(2020)On post-handshake authentication and external PSKs in TLS 1.3Journal of Computer Virology and Hacking Techniques10.1007/s11416-020-00352-0Online publication date: 23-Apr-2020
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11416-020-00352-0
Schäge SSchwenk JLauer S(2020)Privacy-Preserving Authenticated Key Exchange and the Case of IKEv2Public-Key Cryptography – PKC 202010.1007/978-3-030-45388-6_20(567-596)Online publication date: 29-Apr-2020
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45388-6_20
Brendel JFischlin MGünther F(2019)Breakdown Resilience of Key Exchange Protocols: NewHope, TLS 1.3, and HybridsComputer Security – ESORICS 201910.1007/978-3-030-29962-0_25(521-541)Online publication date: 15-Sep-2019
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29962-0_25
Miao YMa JLiu XLi XJiang QZhang J(2017)Attribute-Based Keyword Search over Hierarchical Data in Cloud ComputingIEEE Transactions on Services Computing10.1109/TSC.2017.2757467(1-1)Online publication date: 2017
https://doi.org/10.1109/TSC.2017.2757467
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