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Differentially private spectrum auction with approximate revenue maximization

Authors:

Guihai ChenAuthors Info & Claims

MobiHoc '14: Proceedings of the 15th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing

Pages 185 - 194

https://doi.org/10.1145/2632951.2632974

Published: 11 August 2014 Publication History

Abstract

Dynamic spectrum redistribution---under which spectrum owners lease out under-utilized spectrum to users for financial gain---is an effective way to improve spectrum utilization. Auction is a natural way to incentivize spectrum owners to share their idle resources. In recent years, a number of strategy-proof auction mechanisms have been proposed to stimulate bidders to truthfully reveal their valuations. However, it has been shown that truthfulness is not a necessary condition for revenue maximization. Furthermore, in most existing spectrum auction mechanisms, bidders may infer the valuations---which are private information---of the other bidders from the auction outcome. In this paper, we propose a Differentially privatE spectrum auction mechanism with Approximate Revenue maximization (DEAR). We theoretically prove that DEAR achieves approximate truthfulness, privacy preservation, and approximate revenue maximization. Our extensive evaluations show that DEAR achieves good performance in terms of both revenue and privacy preservation.

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Cited By

You FYuan XNi WJamalipour A(2024)A Novel Privacy-Preserving Incentive Mechanism for Multi-Access Edge ComputingIEEE Transactions on Cognitive Communications and Networking10.1109/TCCN.2024.339130310:5(1928-1943)Online publication date: Oct-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/TCCN.2024.3391303
Guo JWu WWang TJia W(2024)An Online Multi-Item Auction With Differential Privacy in Edge-Assisted BlockchainsIEEE Internet of Things Journal10.1109/JIOT.2023.331717911:5(8133-8145)Online publication date: 1-Mar-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/JIOT.2023.3317179
Jia FZhang MLiu JKhoussainov BEvans RShpitser I(2023)Incentivising diffusion while preserving differential privacyProceedings of the Thirty-Ninth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3625834.3625925(963-972)Online publication date: 31-Jul-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3625834.3625925
Show More Cited By

Index Terms

Differentially private spectrum auction with approximate revenue maximization
1. Networks
  1. Network types
    1. Mobile networks
    2. Wireless access networks

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Published In

cover image ACM Conferences

MobiHoc '14: Proceedings of the 15th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing

August 2014

460 pages

ISBN:9781450326209

DOI:10.1145/2632951

General Chairs:
Jie Wu
Temple University
,
Xiuzhen Cheng
George Washington University
,
Program Chairs:
XiangYang Li
Illinois Institute of Technology
,
Saswati Sarkar
University of Pennsylvania

Copyright © 2014 ACM.

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SIGMOBILE: ACM Special Interest Group on Mobility of Systems, Users, Data and Computing

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 11 August 2014

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MobiHoc'14

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SIGMOBILE

MobiHoc'14: The Fifteenth ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing

August 11 - 14, 2014

Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA

Acceptance Rates

MobiHoc '14 Paper Acceptance Rate 40 of 211 submissions, 19%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 296 of 1,843 submissions, 16%

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Cited By

You FYuan XNi WJamalipour A(2024)A Novel Privacy-Preserving Incentive Mechanism for Multi-Access Edge ComputingIEEE Transactions on Cognitive Communications and Networking10.1109/TCCN.2024.339130310:5(1928-1943)Online publication date: Oct-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/TCCN.2024.3391303
Guo JWu WWang TJia W(2024)An Online Multi-Item Auction With Differential Privacy in Edge-Assisted BlockchainsIEEE Internet of Things Journal10.1109/JIOT.2023.331717911:5(8133-8145)Online publication date: 1-Mar-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/JIOT.2023.3317179
Jia FZhang MLiu JKhoussainov BEvans RShpitser I(2023)Incentivising diffusion while preserving differential privacyProceedings of the Thirty-Ninth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3625834.3625925(963-972)Online publication date: 31-Jul-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3625834.3625925
Jia FZhang MLiu JKhoussainov BAgmon NAn BRicci AYeoh W(2023)Differentially Private Diffusion Auction: The Single-unit CaseProceedings of the 2023 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3545946.3599056(2724-2726)Online publication date: 30-May-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3545946.3599056
Wang ZLi JHu JRen JWang QLi ZLi Y(2023)Towards Privacy-Driven Truthful Incentives for Mobile Crowdsensing Under Untrusted PlatformIEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing10.1109/TMC.2021.309355222:2(1198-1212)Online publication date: 1-Feb-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/TMC.2021.3093552
Ni TChen ZChen LZhang SXu YZhong H(2023)Differentially Private Combinatorial Cloud AuctionIEEE Transactions on Cloud Computing10.1109/TCC.2021.309732811:1(412-425)Online publication date: 1-Jan-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/TCC.2021.3097328
Jin HSu L(2023)Quality-Aware Incentive Mechanism for Mobile CrowdsourcingMobile Crowdsourcing10.1007/978-3-031-32397-3_4(91-116)Online publication date: 21-Apr-2023
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32397-3_4
Zhu TYe DWang WZhou WYu P(2022)More Than Privacy: Applying Differential Privacy in Key Areas of Artificial IntelligenceIEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering10.1109/TKDE.2020.301424634:6(2824-2843)Online publication date: 1-Jun-2022
https://doi.org/10.1109/TKDE.2020.3014246
An DYang QLi DYu WZhao WYan C(2022)Where Am I Parking: Incentive Online Parking-Space Sharing Mechanism With Privacy ProtectionIEEE Transactions on Automation Science and Engineering10.1109/TASE.2020.302483519:1(143-162)Online publication date: Jan-2022
https://doi.org/10.1109/TASE.2020.3024835
Li MWang WZhang JZhang Q(2022)Incentivizing WiFi-Based Multilateration Location VerificationIEEE Internet of Things Journal10.1109/JIOT.2021.30968209:4(3083-3096)Online publication date: 15-Feb-2022
https://doi.org/10.1109/JIOT.2021.3096820
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