[go: up one dir, main page]
More Web Proxy on the site http://driver.im/ skip to main content
10.1145/1160633.1160851acmconferencesArticle/Chapter ViewAbstractPublication PagesaamasConference Proceedingsconference-collections
Article

Competing sellers in online markets: reserve prices, shill bidding, and auction fees

Published: 08 May 2006 Publication History

Abstract

In this paper, we consider competition between sellers offering similar items in concurrent online auctions, where each seller must set its individual auction parameters (such as the reserve price) in such a way as to attract buyers. We show that there exists a pure Nash equilibrium in the case of two sellers with asymmetric production costs. In addition, we show that, rather than setting a reserve price, a seller can further improve its utility by shill bidding (i.e., pretending to be a buyer in order to bid in its own auction). But, using an evolutionary simulation, we show that this shill bidding introduces inefficiences within the market. However, we then go on to show that these inefficiences can be reduced when the mediating auction institution uses appropriate auction fees that deter sellers from submitting shill bids.

References

[1]
S. M. Bohte, E. Gerding, and J. A. La Poutré. Market-based recommendation: Agents that compete for consumer attention. ACM Transactions on Internet Technology, 4:420--448, 2004.
[2]
R. Burguet and J. Sákovics. Imperfect competition in auction design. International Economic Review, 40(1):231--247, 1999.
[3]
R. Preston McAfee. Mechanism design by competing sellers. Econometrica, 61(6):1281--1312, 1993.
[4]
W. Wang, Z. Hidvégi, and A. B. Whinston. Shill-proof fee (SPF) schedule: The sunscreen against seller self-collusion in online english auctions. Working Paper, 2004.

Cited By

View all
  • (2013)Computing pure Bayesian-Nash equilibria in games with finite actions and continuous typesArtificial Intelligence10.1016/j.artint.2012.09.007195(106-139)Online publication date: 1-Feb-2013
  • (2013)An equilibrium analysis of market selection strategies and fee strategies in competing double auction marketplacesAutonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems10.1007/s10458-011-9190-526:2(245-287)Online publication date: 1-Mar-2013
  • (2012)Autonomous Seller Agent for Multiple Simultaneous English AuctionsInternational Journal of Agent Technologies and Systems10.4018/jats.20120401014:2(1-21)Online publication date: 1-Apr-2012
  • Show More Cited By

Recommendations

Comments

Please enable JavaScript to view thecomments powered by Disqus.

Information & Contributors

Information

Published In

cover image ACM Conferences
AAMAS '06: Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
May 2006
1631 pages
ISBN:1595933034
DOI:10.1145/1160633
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

Sponsors

Publisher

Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 08 May 2006

Permissions

Request permissions for this article.

Check for updates

Author Tags

  1. auction fees
  2. competition
  3. mechanism design
  4. shill bidding

Qualifiers

  • Article

Conference

AAMAS06
Sponsor:

Acceptance Rates

Overall Acceptance Rate 1,155 of 5,036 submissions, 23%

Contributors

Other Metrics

Bibliometrics & Citations

Bibliometrics

Article Metrics

  • Downloads (Last 12 months)3
  • Downloads (Last 6 weeks)0
Reflects downloads up to 21 Dec 2024

Other Metrics

Citations

Cited By

View all
  • (2013)Computing pure Bayesian-Nash equilibria in games with finite actions and continuous typesArtificial Intelligence10.1016/j.artint.2012.09.007195(106-139)Online publication date: 1-Feb-2013
  • (2013)An equilibrium analysis of market selection strategies and fee strategies in competing double auction marketplacesAutonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems10.1007/s10458-011-9190-526:2(245-287)Online publication date: 1-Mar-2013
  • (2012)Autonomous Seller Agent for Multiple Simultaneous English AuctionsInternational Journal of Agent Technologies and Systems10.4018/jats.20120401014:2(1-21)Online publication date: 1-Apr-2012
  • (2011)Using Genetic Algorithm to Help the Seller Strategies in Online AuctionKey Engineering Materials10.4028/www.scientific.net/KEM.474-476.1760474-476(1760-1763)Online publication date: Apr-2011
  • (2009)Setting discrete bid levels adaptively in repeated auctionsProceedings of the 11th International Conference on Electronic Commerce10.1145/1593254.1593284(195-204)Online publication date: 12-Aug-2009
  • (2008)Revenue Maximising Adaptive Auctioneer AgentProceedings of the 11th Pacific Rim International Conference on Multi-Agents: Intelligent Agents and Multi-Agent Systems10.1007/978-3-540-89674-6_38(340-347)Online publication date: 15-Dec-2008
  • (2008)Sellers Competing for Buyers in Online MarketsNegotiation, Auctions, and Market Engineering10.1007/978-3-540-77554-6_11(164-170)Online publication date: 2008

View Options

Login options

View options

PDF

View or Download as a PDF file.

PDF

eReader

View online with eReader.

eReader

Media

Figures

Other

Tables

Share

Share

Share this Publication link

Share on social media