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Trusted kernel-based coalition formation

Published: 25 July 2005 Publication History

Abstract

We define Trusted Kernel-based Coalition Formation as a novel extension to the traditional kernel-based coalition formation process which ensures agents choose the most reliable coalition partners and are guaranteed to obtain the payment they deserve. To this end, we develop an encryption-based communication protocol and a payment scheme which ensure that agents cannot manipulate the mechanism to their own benefit. Moreover, we integrate a generic trust model in the coalition formation process that permits the selection of the most reliable agents over repeated coalition games. We empirically evaluate our mechanism when iterated and show that, in the long run, it always chooses the coalition structure that has the maximum expected value and determines the payoffs that match their level of reliability.

References

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Cited By

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  • (2023)A Solution Concept with an Exploration Bias for Repeated Stochastic Coalitional GamesAdvances in Practical Applications of Agents, Multi-Agent Systems, and Cognitive Mimetics. The PAAMS Collection10.1007/978-3-031-37616-0_9(100-112)Online publication date: 12-Jul-2023
  • (2021)Are Exploration-Based Strategies of Interest for Repeated Stochastic Coalitional Games?Advances in Practical Applications of Agents, Multi-Agent Systems, and Social Good. The PAAMS Collection10.1007/978-3-030-85739-4_8(89-100)Online publication date: 25-Sep-2021
  • (2013)Agent-Driven Wireless Sensors Cooperation for Limited Resources AllocationIntelligent Sensor Networks10.1201/b14300-23(427-439)Online publication date: 28-Mar-2013
  • Show More Cited By

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    cover image ACM Conferences
    AAMAS '05: Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
    July 2005
    1407 pages
    ISBN:1595930930
    DOI:10.1145/1082473
    Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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    New York, NY, United States

    Publication History

    Published: 25 July 2005

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    Author Tags

    1. coalition formation
    2. payment protocol
    3. rational agents
    4. task allocation
    5. trust

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    Overall Acceptance Rate 1,155 of 5,036 submissions, 23%

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    View all
    • (2023)A Solution Concept with an Exploration Bias for Repeated Stochastic Coalitional GamesAdvances in Practical Applications of Agents, Multi-Agent Systems, and Cognitive Mimetics. The PAAMS Collection10.1007/978-3-031-37616-0_9(100-112)Online publication date: 12-Jul-2023
    • (2021)Are Exploration-Based Strategies of Interest for Repeated Stochastic Coalitional Games?Advances in Practical Applications of Agents, Multi-Agent Systems, and Social Good. The PAAMS Collection10.1007/978-3-030-85739-4_8(89-100)Online publication date: 25-Sep-2021
    • (2013)Agent-Driven Wireless Sensors Cooperation for Limited Resources AllocationIntelligent Sensor Networks10.1201/b14300-23(427-439)Online publication date: 28-Mar-2013
    • (2013)Cooperative games and multiagent systemsThe Knowledge Engineering Review10.1017/S026988891300010628:4(381-424)Online publication date: 3-May-2013
    • (2012)Sequentially optimal repeated coalition formation under uncertaintyAutonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems10.1007/s10458-010-9157-y24:3(441-484)Online publication date: 1-May-2012
    • (2011)Using coalitions of wind generators and electric vehicles for effective energy market participationThe 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 310.5555/2034396.2034437(1099-1100)Online publication date: 2-May-2011
    • (2011)Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game TheorySynthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning10.2200/S00355ED1V01Y201107AIM0165:6(1-168)Online publication date: 25-Oct-2011
    • (2010)Strategy of agent coalition formation based on outstanding coalition2010 2nd International Conference on Computer Engineering and Technology10.1109/ICCET.2010.5485666(V4-159-V4-162)Online publication date: Apr-2010
    • (2009)Agent long-term coalition creditExpert Systems with Applications: An International Journal10.1016/j.eswa.2008.12.04836:5(9457-9465)Online publication date: 1-Jul-2009
    • (2009)Game‐Theoretic Scheduling of Grid ComputationsMarket‐Oriented Grid and Utility Computing10.1002/9780470455432.ch20(451-474)Online publication date: 17-Nov-2009
    • Show More Cited By

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