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research-article

A goal‐driven approach for the joint deployment of safety and security standards for operators of essential services

Authors:

Christophe Ponsard,

Jeremy Grandclaudon,

Philippe MassonetAuthors Info & Claims

Journal of Software: Evolution and Process, Volume 33, Issue 9

https://doi.org/10.1002/smr.2338

Published: 12 September 2021 Publication History

Summary

Designing safety‐critical software in domains ensuring essential services like transportation, energy, or health requires high assurance techniques and compliance with domain specific standards. As a result of the global interconnectivity and the evolution toward cyber‐physical systems, the increasing exposure to cyber threats calls for the adoption of cyber security standards and frameworks. Although safety and security have different cultures, both fields share similar concepts and tools and are worth being investigated together. This paper provides the background to understand emerging co‐engineering approaches. It advocates for the use of a model‐based approach to provide a sound risk‐oriented process and to capture rationales interconnecting top‐level standards/directives to concrete safety/security measures. We show the benefits of adopting goal‐oriented analysis that can be transposed later to domain‐specific frameworks. Both qualitative and quantitative reasoning aspects are analyzed and discussed, especially to support trade‐off analysis. Our work is driven by a representative case study in drinking water utility in the scope of the NIS regulation for operator of essential services.

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Cited By

Castiglione LLupu E(2024)Which Attacks Lead to Hazards? Combining Safety and Security Analysis for Cyber-Physical SystemsIEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing10.1109/TDSC.2023.330977821:4(2526-2540)Online publication date: 1-Jul-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1109/TDSC.2023.3309778
Daun MTenbergen B(2023)Context modeling for cyber‐physical systemsJournal of Software: Evolution and Process10.1002/smr.245135:7Online publication date: 2-Jul-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1002/smr.2451
Ponsard CRamon VWessel M(2022)Survey of automation practices in model-driven development and operationsProceedings of the Fourth International Workshop on Bots in Software Engineering10.1145/3528228.3528405(14-17)Online publication date: 9-May-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3528228.3528405

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A goal‐driven approach for the joint deployment of safety and security standards for operators of essential services

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Published In

cover image Journal of Software: Evolution and Process

Journal of Software: Evolution and Process Volume 33, Issue 9

September 2021

140 pages

ISSN:2047-7473

EISSN:2047-7481

DOI:10.1002/smr.v33.9

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© 2021 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

United States

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Published: 12 September 2021

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Cited By

Castiglione LLupu E(2024)Which Attacks Lead to Hazards? Combining Safety and Security Analysis for Cyber-Physical SystemsIEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing10.1109/TDSC.2023.330977821:4(2526-2540)Online publication date: 1-Jul-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1109/TDSC.2023.3309778
Daun MTenbergen B(2023)Context modeling for cyber‐physical systemsJournal of Software: Evolution and Process10.1002/smr.245135:7Online publication date: 2-Jul-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1002/smr.2451
Ponsard CRamon VWessel M(2022)Survey of automation practices in model-driven development and operationsProceedings of the Fourth International Workshop on Bots in Software Engineering10.1145/3528228.3528405(14-17)Online publication date: 9-May-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3528228.3528405

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