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Formal Verification of Saber’s Public-Key Encryption Scheme in EasyCrypt

Published: 15 August 2022 Publication History

Abstract

In this work, we consider the formal verification of the public-key encryption scheme of Saber, one of the selected few post-quantum cipher suites currently considered for potential standardization. We formally verify this public-key encryption scheme’s [inline-graphic not available: see fulltext] security and δ-correctness properties, i.e., the properties required to transform the public-key encryption scheme into an [inline-graphic not available: see fulltext] secure and δ-correct key encapsulation mechanism, in EasyCrypt. To this end, we initially devise hand-written proofs for these properties that are significantly more detailed and meticulous than the presently existing proofs. Subsequently, these hand-written proofs serve as a guideline for the formal verification. The results of this endeavor comprise hand-written and computer-verified proofs which demonstrate that Saber’s public-key encryption scheme indeed satisfies the desired security and correctness properties.

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Cited By

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  • (2024)Formally Verifying KyberAdvances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 202410.1007/978-3-031-68379-4_12(384-421)Online publication date: 18-Aug-2024
  • (2023)Machine-Checked Security for  as in RFC 8391 and Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 202310.1007/978-3-031-38554-4_14(421-454)Online publication date: 20-Aug-2023

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Information

Published In

cover image Guide Proceedings
Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2022: 42nd Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2022, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 15–18, 2022, Proceedings, Part I
Aug 2022
821 pages
ISBN:978-3-031-15801-8
DOI:10.1007/978-3-031-15802-5
  • Editors:
  • Yevgeniy Dodis,
  • Thomas Shrimpton

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Springer-Verlag

Berlin, Heidelberg

Publication History

Published: 15 August 2022

Author Tags

  1. Formal Verification
  2. Saber
  3. EasyCrypt

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View all
  • (2024)Formally Verifying KyberAdvances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 202410.1007/978-3-031-68379-4_12(384-421)Online publication date: 18-Aug-2024
  • (2023)Machine-Checked Security for  as in RFC 8391 and Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 202310.1007/978-3-031-38554-4_14(421-454)Online publication date: 20-Aug-2023

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