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Article

The maximum latency of selfish routing

Published: 11 January 2004 Publication History

Abstract

No abstract available.

References

[1]
T. Roughgarden. Designing networks for selfish users is hard. In FOCS '01, pages 472--481.
[2]
T. Roughgarden. The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology. In STOC '02, pages 428--437.
[3]
T. Roughgarden and É. Tardos. How bad is selfish routing? Journal of the ACM, 49(2):236--259, 2002.
[4]
D. Weitz. The price of anarchy. Unpublished manuscript, 2001.

Cited By

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  • (2024)Inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria in network congestion games: the impact of symmetry and network structureACM Transactions on Economics and Computation10.1145/3665590Online publication date: 28-Jun-2024
  • (2018)Polynomial Time Equilibria in Bottleneck Congestion GamesProceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/3219166.3219221(393-409)Online publication date: 11-Jun-2018
  • (2015)How egalitarian are Nash equilibria in network cost-sharing games?Operations Research Letters10.1016/j.orl.2015.08.00643:6(564-566)Online publication date: 1-Nov-2015
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Published In

cover image ACM Conferences
SODA '04: Proceedings of the fifteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
January 2004
1113 pages
ISBN:089871558X

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Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics

United States

Publication History

Published: 11 January 2004

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Overall Acceptance Rate 411 of 1,322 submissions, 31%

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Cited By

View all
  • (2024)Inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria in network congestion games: the impact of symmetry and network structureACM Transactions on Economics and Computation10.1145/3665590Online publication date: 28-Jun-2024
  • (2018)Polynomial Time Equilibria in Bottleneck Congestion GamesProceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/3219166.3219221(393-409)Online publication date: 11-Jun-2018
  • (2015)How egalitarian are Nash equilibria in network cost-sharing games?Operations Research Letters10.1016/j.orl.2015.08.00643:6(564-566)Online publication date: 1-Nov-2015
  • (2010)Bottleneck congestion games with logarithmic price of anarchyProceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory10.5555/1929237.1929257(222-233)Online publication date: 18-Oct-2010
  • (2009)Atomic routing games on maximum congestionTheoretical Computer Science10.1016/j.tcs.2009.04.015410:36(3337-3347)Online publication date: 1-Aug-2009
  • (2009)Adaptive routing with stale informationTheoretical Computer Science10.1016/j.tcs.2008.01.055410:36(3357-3371)Online publication date: 1-Aug-2009
  • (2008)Quality of routing congestion games in wireless sensor networksProceedings of the 4th Annual International Conference on Wireless Internet10.5555/1554126.1554214(1-6)Online publication date: 17-Nov-2008
  • (2008)Altruism, selfishness, and spite in traffic routingProceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce10.1145/1386790.1386816(140-149)Online publication date: 8-Jul-2008
  • (2006)On the severity of Braess's paradoxJournal of Computer and System Sciences10.1016/j.jcss.2005.05.00972:5(922-953)Online publication date: 1-Aug-2006
  • (2006)Wardrop equilibria and price of stability for bottleneck games with splittable trafficProceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics10.1007/11944874_30(331-342)Online publication date: 15-Dec-2006
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