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An algorithm for constructing and solving imperfect recall abstractions of large extensive-form games

Published: 19 August 2017 Publication History

Abstract

We solve large two-player zero-sum extensive-form games with perfect recall. We propose a new algorithm based on fictitious play that significantly reduces memory requirements for storing average strategies. The key feature is exploiting imperfect recall abstractions while preserving the convergence rate and guarantees of fictitious play applied directly to the perfect recall game. The algorithm creates a coarse imperfect recall abstraction of the perfect recall game and automatically refines its information set structure only where the imperfect recall might cause problems. Experimental evaluation shows that our novel algorithm is able to solve a simplified poker game with 7 ċ 105 information sets using an abstracted game with only 1:8% of information sets of the original game. Additional experiments on poker and randomly generated games suggest that the relative size of the abstraction decreases as the size of the solved games increases.

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Cited By

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  • (2018)Ex ante coordination and collusion in zero-sum multi-player extensive-form gamesProceedings of the 32nd International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems10.5555/3327546.3327633(9661-9671)Online publication date: 3-Dec-2018
  • (2018)A unified framework for extensive-form game abstraction with boundsProceedings of the 32nd International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems10.5555/3326943.3327000(613-624)Online publication date: 3-Dec-2018

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Published In

cover image Guide Proceedings
IJCAI'17: Proceedings of the 26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
August 2017
5253 pages
ISBN:9780999241103

Sponsors

  • Australian Comp Soc: Australian Computer Society
  • NSF: National Science Foundation
  • Griffith University
  • University of Technology Sydney
  • AI Journal: AI Journal

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AAAI Press

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Published: 19 August 2017

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View all
  • (2018)Ex ante coordination and collusion in zero-sum multi-player extensive-form gamesProceedings of the 32nd International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems10.5555/3327546.3327633(9661-9671)Online publication date: 3-Dec-2018
  • (2018)A unified framework for extensive-form game abstraction with boundsProceedings of the 32nd International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems10.5555/3326943.3327000(613-624)Online publication date: 3-Dec-2018

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