Computing Balanced Solutions for Large International Kidney Exchange Schemes when Cycle Length is Unbounded
Authors: 
Márton Benedek, Péter Biró, Gergely Csáji, Matthew Johnson, Daniël Paulusma, Xin YeAuthors Info & Claims
Pages 2153 - 2155
Abstract
In kidney exchange programmes (KEP) patients may swap their incompatible donors leading to cycles of kidney transplants. Countries try to merge their national patient-donor pools leading to international KEPs (IKEPs). Long-term stability of an IKEP can be achieved through a credit-based system. The goal is to find, in each round, an optimal solution that closely approximates this target allocation. We provide both theoretical and experimental results for the case where the cycle length is unbounded.
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- Computing Balanced Solutions for Large International Kidney Exchange Schemes when Cycle Length is Unbounded
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Computing Balanced Solutions for Large International Kidney Exchange Schemes
AAMAS '22: Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent SystemsTo overcome incompatibility issues, kidney patients may swap their donors. In international kidney exchange programmes (IKEPs), countries merge their national patient-donor pools. We consider a recent credit system where in each round, countries are ...
Computing balanced solutions for large international kidney exchange schemes
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Published In
May 2024
2898 pages
ISBN:9798400704864
- General Chairs:
- Mehdi Dastani,
- Jaime Simão Sichman,
- Program Chairs:
- Natasha Alechina,
- Virginia Dignum
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Publisher
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Richland, SC
Publication History
Published: 06 May 2024
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- Extended-abstract
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- Leverhulme Trust
- National Research Development and Innovation Office of Hungary
- Hungarian Scientific Research Fund
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AAMAS '24
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AAMAS '24: International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
May 6 - 10, 2024
Auckland, New Zealand
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