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Multiple Referenda and Multiwinner Elections Using Hamming Distances: Complexity and Manipulability

Published: 04 May 2015 Publication History

Abstract

We study multiple referenda and committee elections, when the ballot of each voter is simply a set of approved binary issues (or candidates). Two well-known rules under this model are the commonly used candidate-wise majority, also called the minisum rule, as well as the minimax rule. In the former, the elected committee consists of the candidates approved by a majority of voters, whereas the latter picks a committee minimizing the maximum Hamming distance to all ballots.
As these rules are in some ways extreme points in the whole spectrum of solutions, we consider a general family of rules, using the Ordered Weighted Averaging (OWA) operators. Each rule is parameterized by a weight vector, showing the importance of the i-th highest Hamming distance of the outcome to the voters. The objective then is to minimize the weighted sum of the (ordered) distances. We study mostly computational, but also manipulability properties for this family. We first exhibit that for many rules, it is NP-hard to find a winning committee. We then proceed to identify cases where the problem is either efficiently solvable, or approximable with a small approximation factor. Finally, we investigate the issue of manipulating such rules and provide conditions that make this possible.

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  • (2024)Combining Voting and Abstract Argumentation to Understand Online DiscussionsProceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3635637.3662864(170-179)Online publication date: 6-May-2024
  • (2023)Free-Riding in Multi-Issue DecisionsProceedings of the 2023 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3545946.3598877(2040-2048)Online publication date: 30-May-2023
  • (2019)Parameterized Complexity of Committee Elections with Dichotomous and Trichotomous VotesProceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3306127.3331733(503-510)Online publication date: 8-May-2019
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      Published In

      cover image ACM Other conferences
      AAMAS '15: Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
      May 2015
      2072 pages
      ISBN:9781450334136

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      • IFAAMAS

      In-Cooperation

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      International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

      Richland, SC

      Publication History

      Published: 04 May 2015

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      Author Tags

      1. approval voting
      2. minimax
      3. minisum
      4. ordered weighted averaging operators

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      • Research-article

      Funding Sources

      • Agence Nationale de la Recherche
      • European Social Fund and Greek national funds (National Strategic Reference Framework - NSRF)

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      AAMAS'15
      Sponsor:

      Acceptance Rates

      AAMAS '15 Paper Acceptance Rate 108 of 670 submissions, 16%;
      Overall Acceptance Rate 1,155 of 5,036 submissions, 23%

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      View all
      • (2024)Combining Voting and Abstract Argumentation to Understand Online DiscussionsProceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3635637.3662864(170-179)Online publication date: 6-May-2024
      • (2023)Free-Riding in Multi-Issue DecisionsProceedings of the 2023 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3545946.3598877(2040-2048)Online publication date: 30-May-2023
      • (2019)Parameterized Complexity of Committee Elections with Dichotomous and Trichotomous VotesProceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3306127.3331733(503-510)Online publication date: 8-May-2019
      • (2017)Manipulation of Hamming-based Approval Voting for Multiple Referenda and Committee ElectionsProceedings of the 16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3091125.3091212(597-605)Online publication date: 8-May-2017
      • (2017)Every team deserves a second chanceAutonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems10.1007/s10458-016-9348-231:5(1003-1054)Online publication date: 1-Sep-2017
      • (2016)Is promoting beliefs useful to make them accepted in networks of agents?Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3060621.3060793(1237-1243)Online publication date: 9-Jul-2016
      • (2016)Conditional and sequential approval voting on combinatorial domainsProceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3060621.3060634(88-94)Online publication date: 9-Jul-2016
      • (2016)Parameterized Complexity of Winner Determination in Minimax Committee ElectionsProceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems10.5555/2936924.2936975(341-349)Online publication date: 9-May-2016
      • (2016)Finding a collective set of itemsArtificial Intelligence10.1016/j.artint.2016.09.003241:C(191-216)Online publication date: 1-Dec-2016
      • (2015)OWA-Based Extensions of the Chamberlin---Courant RuleProceedings of the 4th International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory - Volume 934610.1007/978-3-319-23114-3_29(486-502)Online publication date: 27-Sep-2015

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