poster

Generalized second price auctions with value externalities

Authors:

Weidong Ma,

Tao Wu,

Tao Qin,

Tie-Yan LiuAuthors Info & Claims

AAMAS '14: Proceedings of the 2014 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems

Pages 1457 - 1458

Published: 05 May 2014 Publication History

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Abstract

We consider a new setting of ad auctions with value externalities. Under such a setting, we perform theoretic analysis on two implementations of generalized second price auctions (GSP): GSP_S and GSP_V. Our analysis shows that both GSP_S and GSP_V admit at least one pure Nash equilibrium for the single-slot case, while pure Nash equilibrium may not exist for the multi-slot case. Furthermore, we prove that the price of anarchy of GSP_S does not have a constant upper bound, while for GSP_V one can achieve a constant upper bound under mild assumptions.

References

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B. Edelman, M. Ostrovsky, and M. Schwarz. Internet advertising and the generalized second price auction: Selling billions of dollars worth of keywords. Am. Econ. Rev., 97(1):242--259, March 2007.

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[3]

D. Hoy, K. Jain, and C. A. Wilkens. Coopetitive ad auctions. In CoRR, 2012.

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R. P. Leme and E. Tardos. Pure and bayes-nash price of anarchy for generalized second price auction. In Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2010 51st Annual IEEE Symposium on, pages 735--744. IEEE, 2010.

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Li ZZheng ZWu FChen GAndre EKoenig SDastani MSukthankar G(2018)On Designing Optimal Data Purchasing Strategies for Online Ad AuctionsProceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3237383.3237927(1522-1530)Online publication date: 9-Jul-2018
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3237383.3237927
Rong JQin TAn BLiu TSingh SMarkovitch S(2017)Revenue maximization for finitely repeated ad auctionsProceedings of the Thirty-First AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3298239.3298337(663-669)Online publication date: 4-Feb-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3298239.3298337
Qin TChen WLiu T(2015)Sponsored Search AuctionsACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology10.1145/26681085:4(1-34)Online publication date: 23-Jan-2015
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2668108

Index Terms

Generalized second price auctions with value externalities
1. Applied computing
  1. Law, social and behavioral sciences
    1. Economics

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Information & Contributors

Information

Published In

AAMAS '14: Proceedings of the 2014 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems

May 2014

1774 pages

ISBN:9781450327381

General Chairs:
Ana Bazzan
UFRGS, Brazil
,
Michael Huhns
University of South Carolina, USA
,
Program Chairs:
Alessio Lomuscio
Imperial College London, UK
,
Paul Scerri
Carnegie Mellon University, USA

In-Cooperation

SIGAI: ACM Special Interest Group on Artificial Intelligence

Publisher

International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

Richland, SC

Publication History

Published: 05 May 2014

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AAMAS '14

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AAMAS '14: International conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems

May 5 - 9, 2014

Paris, France

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AAMAS '14 Paper Acceptance Rate 169 of 709 submissions, 24%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 1,155 of 5,036 submissions, 23%

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Li ZZheng ZWu FChen GAndre EKoenig SDastani MSukthankar G(2018)On Designing Optimal Data Purchasing Strategies for Online Ad AuctionsProceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3237383.3237927(1522-1530)Online publication date: 9-Jul-2018
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3237383.3237927
Rong JQin TAn BLiu TSingh SMarkovitch S(2017)Revenue maximization for finitely repeated ad auctionsProceedings of the Thirty-First AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3298239.3298337(663-669)Online publication date: 4-Feb-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3298239.3298337
Qin TChen WLiu T(2015)Sponsored Search AuctionsACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology10.1145/26681085:4(1-34)Online publication date: 23-Jan-2015
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2668108

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