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Computer Science > Computer Science and Game Theory

arXiv:2303.00868 (cs)
[Submitted on 1 Mar 2023]

Title:Allocating the surplus induced by cooperation in distribution chains with multiple suppliers and retailers

Authors:Luis A. Guardiola, Ana Meca, Justo Puerto
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Abstract:The coordination of actions and the allocation of profit in supply chains under decentralized control play an important role in improving the profits of retailers and suppliers in the chain. We focus on supply chains under decentralized control in which noncompeting retailers can order from multiple suppliers to replenish their stocks. Suppliers' production capacity is bounded. The goal of the firms in the chain is to maximize their individual profits. As the outcome under decentralized control is inefficient, coordination of actions between cooperating agents can improve individual profits. Cooperative game theory is used to analyze cooperation between agents. We define multi-retailer-supplier games and show that agents can always achieve together an optimal profit and they have incentives to cooperate and to form the grand coalition. Moreover, we show that there always exist stable allocations of the total profit among the firms upon which no coalition can improve. Then we propose and characterize a stable allocation of the total surplus induced by cooperation.
Subjects: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT)
MSC classes: 91A12, 90B99
Cite as: arXiv:2303.00868 [cs.GT]
  (or arXiv:2303.00868v1 [cs.GT] for this version)
  https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2303.00868
Related DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102889

Submission history

From: Luis Guardiola [view email]
[v1] Wed, 1 Mar 2023 23:50:20 UTC (19 KB)
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