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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security

arXiv:2211.06213 (cs)
[Submitted on 11 Nov 2022 (v1), last revised 14 Nov 2022 (this version, v2)]

Title:Committed by Accident: Studying Prevention and Remediation Strategies Against Secret Leakage in Source Code Repositories

Authors:Alexander Krause, Jan H. Klemmer, Nicolas Huaman, Dominik Wermke, Yasemin Acar, Sascha Fahl
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Abstract:Version control systems for source code, such as Git, are key tools in modern software development environments. Many developers use online services, such as GitHub or GitLab, for collaborative software development. While software projects often require code secrets to work, such as API keys or passwords, they need to be handled securely within the project. Previous research and news articles have illustrated that developers are blameworthy of committing code secrets, such as private encryption keys, passwords, or API keys, accidentally to public source code repositories. However, making secrets publicly available might have disastrous consequences, such as leaving systems vulnerable to attacks. In a mixed-methods study, we surveyed 109 developers and conducted 14 in-depth semi-structured interviews with developers which experienced secret leakage in the past. We find that 30.3% of our participants have encountered secret leakage in the past, and that developers are facing several challenges with secret leakage prevention and remediation. Based on our findings, we discuss challenges, e. g., estimating risks of leaked secrets, and needs of developers in remediating and preventing code secret leaks, e. g., low adoption requirements. We also give recommendations for developers and source code platform providers to reduce the risk of secret leakage.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2211.06213 [cs.CR]
  (or arXiv:2211.06213v2 [cs.CR] for this version)
  https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2211.06213

Submission history

From: Alexander Krause [view email]
[v1] Fri, 11 Nov 2022 14:04:13 UTC (725 KB)
[v2] Mon, 14 Nov 2022 07:10:54 UTC (725 KB)
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