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Electrical Engineering and Systems Science > Systems and Control

arXiv:2407.05020 (eess)
[Submitted on 6 Jul 2024]

Title:A game theory analysis of decentralized epidemic management with opinion dynamics

Authors:Olivier Lindamulage De Silva, Samson Lasaulce, Irinel-Constantin Morarescu, Vineeth S. Varma
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Abstract:In this paper, we introduce a static game that allows one to numerically assess the loss of efficiency induced by decentralized control or management of a global epidemic. Each player represents a region which is assumed to choose its control to implement a tradeoff between socio-economic aspects and health aspects; the control comprises both epidemic control physical measures and influence actions on the region opinion. The Generalized Nash equilibrium $(\mathrm{GNE})$ analysis of the proposed game model is conducted. The direct analysis of this game of practical interest is non-trivial but it turns out that one can construct an auxiliary game which allows one: to prove existence and uniqueness; to compute the GNE and the optimal centralized solution (sum-cost) of the game. These results allow us to assess numerically the loss (measured in terms of Price of Anarchy ($\mathrm{PoA}$)) induced by decentralization with or without taking into account the opinion dynamics.
Subjects: Systems and Control (eess.SY)
Cite as: arXiv:2407.05020 [eess.SY]
  (or arXiv:2407.05020v1 [eess.SY] for this version)
  https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2407.05020

Submission history

From: Vineeth Varma S [view email]
[v1] Sat, 6 Jul 2024 09:27:20 UTC (2,560 KB)
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