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Inferring Reputation Promotes the Evolution of Cooperation in Spatial Social Dilemma Games

Figure 6

Full bK phase diagrams on the square lattice.

Blue solid and red dashed lines mark the border between pure and phases and the mixed phase, respectively. (a) depicts the phase diagram for the traditional version. There exists an intermediate uncertainty in the strategy adopting process, where the survivability of cooperators is optimal, i.e., is maximal. (b) depicts the phase diagram under the inferring reputation mechanism, which is qualitatively different from the above case. In addition to the monotonous increasing borderline separating the pure and mixed phases, a non-monotonous transition has also replaced the monotonous one. Since the phenomenon in (a) can only be observed on the interaction topologies lacking overlapping triangles [76], [80], the change of phase transition is attributed to the possible alternations of effective interaction networks.

Figure 6

doi: https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0040218.g006