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Temporary Block Withholding Attacks on Filecoin’s Expected Consensus

Published: 16 October 2023 Publication History

Abstract

Filecoin is the most impactful storage-oriented cryptocurrency. In this system, miners dedicate their storage space to the network and verify transactions to earn rewards. Nowadays, Filecoin’s network capacity has surpassed 15 exbibytes.
In this paper, we propose three temporary block withholding attacks to challenge Filecoin’s expected consensus (EC). Specifically, we first deconstruct EC following old-fashioned methods (which have been widely developed since 2009) to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of EC’s design. We then present three temporary block withholding schemes by leveraging the shortcomings of EC. We build Markov Decision Process (MDP) models for the three attacks to calculate the adversary’s gains. We develop Monte Carlo simulators to mimic the mining strategies of the adversary and other miners and indicate the impacts of the three attacks on expectation. As a result, we show that our three attacks have significant impacts on Filecoin’s mining fairness and transaction throughput. For instance, when honest miners who control more than half the global storage power update their tipsets (i.e., the collection of blocks in the same epoch that have the same parents) after the default transmission cutoff time, an adversary with 1% of the global storage power is able to launch temporary block withholding attacks without a loss in revenue, which could affect Filecoin’s security and performance. Finally, we discuss the implications of our attacks and propose several countermeasures to mitigate them.

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Cited By

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  • (2024)SIM: Achieving High Profit Through Integration of Selfish Strategy Into Innocent MiningIEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management10.1109/TNSM.2024.343586921:6(6153-6173)Online publication date: Dec-2024
  • (2024)SoK: Decentralized storage networkHigh-Confidence Computing10.1016/j.hcc.2024.1002394:3(100239)Online publication date: Sep-2024

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Published In

cover image ACM Other conferences
RAID '23: Proceedings of the 26th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses
October 2023
769 pages
ISBN:9798400707650
DOI:10.1145/3607199
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 16 October 2023

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Author Tags

  1. Blockchains
  2. Consensus
  3. Withholding attacks.

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  • Protocol Labs Research Grants

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RAID 2023

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Overall Acceptance Rate 43 of 173 submissions, 25%

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Cited By

View all
  • (2024)SIM: Achieving High Profit Through Integration of Selfish Strategy Into Innocent MiningIEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management10.1109/TNSM.2024.343586921:6(6153-6173)Online publication date: Dec-2024
  • (2024)SoK: Decentralized storage networkHigh-Confidence Computing10.1016/j.hcc.2024.1002394:3(100239)Online publication date: Sep-2024

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