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Jäger: Automated Telephone Call Traceback

Published: 09 December 2024 Publication History

Abstract

Unsolicited telephone calls that facilitate fraud or unlawful telemarketing continue to overwhelm network users and the regulators who prosecute them. The first step in prosecuting phone abuse is traceback --- identifying the call originator. This fundamental investigative task currently requires hours of manual effort per call. In this paper, we introduce Jäger, a distributed secure call traceback system. Jäger can trace a call in a few seconds, even with partial deployment, while cryptographically preserving the privacy of call parties, carrier trade secrets like peers and call volume, and limiting the threat of bulk analysis. We establish definitions and requirements of secure traceback, then develop a suite of protocols that meet these requirements using witness encryption, oblivious pseudorandom functions, and group signatures. We prove these protocols secure in the universal composibility framework. We then demonstrate that Jäger has low compute and bandwidth costs per call, and these costs scale linearly with call volume. Jäger provides an efficient, secure, privacy-preserving system to revolutionize telephone abuse investigation with minimal costs to operators.

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cover image ACM Conferences
CCS '24: Proceedings of the 2024 on ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
December 2024
5188 pages
ISBN:9798400706363
DOI:10.1145/3658644
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Published: 09 December 2024

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  1. STIR/SHAKEN
  2. distributed system
  3. network abuse
  4. privacy-preserving
  5. telephone networks
  6. traceback

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