Boosting Advertising Space: Designing Ad Auctions for Augment Advertising
Authors: 
Yangsu Liu, Dagui Chen, Zhenzhe Zheng, Zhilin Zhang, Chuan Yu, Fan Wu, Guihai ChenAuthors Info & Claims
Pages 1066 - 1074
Abstract
In online e-commerce platforms, sponsored ads are always mixed with non-sponsored organic content (recommended items). To guarantee user experience, online platforms always impose strict limitations on the number of ads displayed, becoming the bottleneck for advertising revenue. To boost advertising space, we introduce a novel advertising business paradigm called Augment Advertising, where once a user clicks on a leading ad on the main page, instead of being shown the corresponding products, a collection of mini-detail ads relevant to the clicked ad is displayed. A key component for augment advertising is to design ad auctions to jointly select leading ads on the main page and mini-detail ads on the augment ad page. In this work, we decouple the ad auction into a two-stage auction, including a leading ad auction and a mini-detail ad auction. We design the Potential Generalized Second Price (PGSP) auction with Symmetric Nash Equilibrium (SNE) for leading ads, and adopt GSP auction for mini-detail ads. We have deployed augment advertising on Taobao advertising platform, and conducted extensive offline evaluations and online A/B tests. The evaluation results show that augment advertising could guarantee user experience while improving the ad revenue and the PGSP auction outperforms baselines in terms of revenue and user experience in augment advertising.
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Index Terms
- Boosting Advertising Space: Designing Ad Auctions for Augment Advertising
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Information
Published In
February 2023
1345 pages
ISBN:9781450394079
DOI:10.1145/3539597
- General Chairs:
- Tat-Seng Chua,
- Hady Lauw,
- Program Chairs:
- Luo Si,
- Evimaria Terzi,
- Panayiotis Tsaparas
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Publication History
Published: 27 February 2023
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- Research-article
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- National Natural Science Foundation of China
- Shanghai Science and Technology Fund
- New Generation Artificial Intelligence
Conference
WSDM '23: The Sixteenth ACM International Conference on Web Search and Data Mining
February 27 - March 3, 2023
Singapore, Singapore
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