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See through Walls: Detecting Malware in SGX Enclaves with SGX-Bouncer

Authors:

Xiaoning LiAuthors Info & Claims

ASIA CCS '21: Proceedings of the 2021 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security

Pages 931 - 943

https://doi.org/10.1145/3433210.3437531

Published: 04 June 2021 Publication History

Abstract

Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) offers strong confidentiality and integrity protection to software programs running in untrusted operating systems. Unfortunately, SGX may be abused by attackers to shield suspicious payloads and conceal misbehaviors in SGX enclaves, which cannot be easily detected by existing defense solutions. There is no comprehensive study conducted to characterize malicious enclaves. In this paper, we present the first systematic study that scrutinizes all possible interaction interfaces between enclaves and the outside (i.e., cache-memory hierarchy, host virtual memory, and enclave-mode transitions), and identifies seven attack vectors. Moreover, we propose SGX-Bouncer, a detection framework that can detect these attacks by leveraging multifarious side-channel observations and SGX-specific features. We conduct empirical evaluations with existing malicious SGX applications, which suggests SGX-Bouncer can effectively detect various abnormal behaviors from malicious enclaves.

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Cited By

Feng DQin YFeng WLi WShang KMa H(2024)Survey of research on confidential computingIET Communications10.1049/cmu2.1275918:9(535-556)Online publication date: 23-Apr-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1049/cmu2.12759
Zhang XXu ZCheng HChe TXu KWang WZhao WWang CLi Q(2023)Secure Collaborative Learning in Mining Pool via Robust and Efficient Verification2023 IEEE 43rd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS)10.1109/ICDCS57875.2023.00012(794-805)Online publication date: Jul-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/ICDCS57875.2023.00012
Khan AZou MKim KXu DBianchi ATian D(2023)Fuzzing SGX Enclaves via Host Program Mutations2023 IEEE 8th European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)10.1109/EuroSP57164.2023.00035(472-488)Online publication date: Jul-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/EuroSP57164.2023.00035
Show More Cited By

Index Terms

See through Walls: Detecting Malware in SGX Enclaves with SGX-Bouncer
1. Security and privacy
  1. Intrusion/anomaly detection and malware mitigation
    1. Malware and its mitigation
  2. Systems security
    1. Operating systems security
      1. Trusted computing

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Published In

cover image ACM Conferences

ASIA CCS '21: Proceedings of the 2021 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security

May 2021

975 pages

ISBN:9781450382878

DOI:10.1145/3433210

General Chairs:
Jiannong Cao
The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong
,
Man Ho Au
The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
,
Program Chairs:
Zhiqiang Lin
The Ohio State University, USA
,
Moti Yung
Google and Columbia University, USA

Copyright © 2021 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Publication History

Published: 04 June 2021

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National Key R&D Program of China
NSF
NSFC

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ASIA CCS '21

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SIGSAC

ASIA CCS '21: ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security

June 7 - 11, 2021

Virtual Event, Hong Kong

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Overall Acceptance Rate 418 of 2,322 submissions, 18%

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Cited By

Feng DQin YFeng WLi WShang KMa H(2024)Survey of research on confidential computingIET Communications10.1049/cmu2.1275918:9(535-556)Online publication date: 23-Apr-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1049/cmu2.12759
Zhang XXu ZCheng HChe TXu KWang WZhao WWang CLi Q(2023)Secure Collaborative Learning in Mining Pool via Robust and Efficient Verification2023 IEEE 43rd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS)10.1109/ICDCS57875.2023.00012(794-805)Online publication date: Jul-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/ICDCS57875.2023.00012
Khan AZou MKim KXu DBianchi ATian D(2023)Fuzzing SGX Enclaves via Host Program Mutations2023 IEEE 8th European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)10.1109/EuroSP57164.2023.00035(472-488)Online publication date: Jul-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/EuroSP57164.2023.00035
Weber DThomas FGerlach LZhang RSchwarz M(2023)Reviving Meltdown 3aComputer Security – ESORICS 202310.1007/978-3-031-51479-1_5(80-99)Online publication date: 25-Sep-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-031-51479-1_5

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