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Evidence Acquisition and Voluntary Disclosure

Published: 18 July 2021 Publication History

Abstract

A sender seeks hard evidence to persuade a receiver to take a certain action. There is uncertainty about whether the sender obtains evidence. If she does, she can choose to disclose it or pretend to not have obtained it. When the probability of obtaining information is low, we show that the optimal evidence structure is a binary certification: all it reveals is whether the (continuous) state of the world is above or below a certain threshold. Moreover, the set of low states that are concealed is non-monotone in the probability of obtaining evidence. When binary structures are optimal, higher uncertainty leads to less pooling at the bottom because the sender uses binary certification to commit to disclose evidence more often.

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  1. Evidence Acquisition and Voluntary Disclosure

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    cover image ACM Conferences
    EC '21: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
    July 2021
    950 pages
    ISBN:9781450385541
    DOI:10.1145/3465456
    Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the Owner/Author.

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    Association for Computing Machinery

    New York, NY, United States

    Publication History

    Published: 18 July 2021

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    Author Tags

    1. hard evidence
    2. information acquisition
    3. information design
    4. persuasion
    5. voluntary disclosure

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