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Dashboard Mechanisms for Online Marketplaces

Published: 17 June 2019 Publication History

Abstract

This paper gives a theoretical model for design and analysis of mechanisms for online marketplaces where a bidding dashboard enables the bid-optimization of long-lived agents. We assume that a good allocation algorithm exists when given the true values of the agents and we develop online winner-pays-bid and all-pay mechanisms that implement the same outcome of the algorithm with the aid of a bidding dashboard. The bidding dashboards that we develop work in conjunction with the mechanism to guarantee that bidding according to the dashboard is strategically equivalent (with vanishing utility difference) to bidding truthfully in the truthful implementation of the allocation algorithm. Our dashboard mechanism makes only a single call to the allocation algorithm in each stage.

Supplementary Material

MP4 File (p591-hartline.mp4)

References

[1]
Susan Athey and Denis Nekipelov. 2010. A structural model of sponsored search advertising auctions. In Sixth ad auctions workshop .
[2]
Moshe Babaioff, Robert D Kleinberg, and Aleksandrs Slivkins. 2010. Truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation. In Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce. ACM, 43--52.

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  • (2020)Mechanisms for a No-Regret Agent: Beyond the Common Prior2020 IEEE 61st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS)10.1109/FOCS46700.2020.00033(259-270)Online publication date: Nov-2020

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cover image ACM Conferences
EC '19: Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
June 2019
947 pages
ISBN:9781450367929
DOI:10.1145/3328526
Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the Owner/Author.

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 17 June 2019

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  • Extended-abstract

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EC '19
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EC '19: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
June 24 - 28, 2019
AZ, Phoenix, USA

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EC '19 Paper Acceptance Rate 106 of 382 submissions, 28%;
Overall Acceptance Rate 664 of 2,389 submissions, 28%

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The 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
July 7 - 11, 2025
Stanford , CA , USA

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  • (2020)Mechanisms for a No-Regret Agent: Beyond the Common Prior2020 IEEE 61st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS)10.1109/FOCS46700.2020.00033(259-270)Online publication date: Nov-2020

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