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Surrogate Scoring Rules

Authors:

Yiling ChenAuthors Info & Claims

EC '20: Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

Pages 853 - 871

https://doi.org/10.1145/3391403.3399488

Published: 13 July 2020 Publication History

Abstract

Strictly proper scoring rules (SPSR) are incentive compatible for eliciting information about random variables from strategic agents when the principal can reward agents after the realization of the random variables. They also quantify the quality of elicited information, with more accurate predictions receiving higher scores in expectation. In this paper, we extend such scoring rules to settings where a principal elicits private probabilistic beliefs but only has access to agents' reports. We name our solution Surrogate Scoring Rules (SSR). SSR build on a bias correction step and an error rate estimation procedure for a reference answer defined using agents' reports. We show that, with a single bit of information about the prior distribution of the random variables, SSR in a multi-task setting recover SPSR in expectation, as if having access to the ground truth. Therefore, a salient feature of SSR is that they quantify the quality of information despite the lack of ground truth, just as SPSR do for the setting with ground truth. As a by-product, SSR induce dominant truthfulness in reporting. Our method is verified both theoretically and empirically using data collected from real human forecasters.

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Cited By

Marcoci AWilkinson DVercammen AWintle BAbatayo ABaskin EBerkman HBuchanan ECapitán SCapitán TChan GCheng KCoupé TDryhurst SDuan JEdlund JErrington TFedor AFidler FField JFox NFraser HFreeman AHanea AHolzmeister FHong SHuggins RHuntington-Klein NJohannesson MJones AKapoor HKerr JKline Struhl MKołczyńska MLiu YLoomas ZLuis BMéndez EMiske OMody FNast CNosek BSimon Parsons EPfeiffer TReed WRoozenbeek JSchlyfestone ASchneider CSoh ASong ZTagat ATutor MTyner AUrbanska Kvan der Linden S(2024)Predicting the replicability of social and behavioural science claims in COVID-19 preprintsNature Human Behaviour10.1038/s41562-024-01961-1Online publication date: 20-Dec-2024
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-024-01961-1
Keppo JSatopää V(2024)Bayesian herd detection for dynamic dataInternational Journal of Forecasting10.1016/j.ijforecast.2023.03.00140:1(285-301)Online publication date: Jan-2024
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijforecast.2023.03.001
Zhu ZYao YSun JLi HLiu YKrause ABrunskill ECho KEngelhardt BSabato SScarlett J(2023)Weak proxies are sufficient and preferable for fairness with missing sensitive attributesProceedings of the 40th International Conference on Machine Learning10.5555/3618408.3620230(43258-43288)Online publication date: 23-Jul-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3618408.3620230
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Index Terms

Surrogate Scoring Rules
1. Information systems
  1. World Wide Web
    1. Web applications
      1. Crowdsourcing
        Incentive schemes
2. Theory of computation
  1. Theory and algorithms for application domains
    1. Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
      1. Quality of equilibria

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Published In

cover image ACM Conferences

EC '20: Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

July 2020

937 pages

ISBN:9781450379755

DOI:10.1145/3391403

General Chairs:
Péter Biró
Hungarian Academy of Sciences
,
Jason Hartline
Northwestern University
,
Program Chairs:
Michael Ostrovsky
Stanford University
,
Ariel Procaccia
Harvard University

Copyright © 2020 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

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Published: 13 July 2020

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EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

July 13 - 17, 2020

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Overall Acceptance Rate 664 of 2,389 submissions, 28%

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Marcoci AWilkinson DVercammen AWintle BAbatayo ABaskin EBerkman HBuchanan ECapitán SCapitán TChan GCheng KCoupé TDryhurst SDuan JEdlund JErrington TFedor AFidler FField JFox NFraser HFreeman AHanea AHolzmeister FHong SHuggins RHuntington-Klein NJohannesson MJones AKapoor HKerr JKline Struhl MKołczyńska MLiu YLoomas ZLuis BMéndez EMiske OMody FNast CNosek BSimon Parsons EPfeiffer TReed WRoozenbeek JSchlyfestone ASchneider CSoh ASong ZTagat ATutor MTyner AUrbanska Kvan der Linden S(2024)Predicting the replicability of social and behavioural science claims in COVID-19 preprintsNature Human Behaviour10.1038/s41562-024-01961-1Online publication date: 20-Dec-2024
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-024-01961-1
Keppo JSatopää V(2024)Bayesian herd detection for dynamic dataInternational Journal of Forecasting10.1016/j.ijforecast.2023.03.00140:1(285-301)Online publication date: Jan-2024
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijforecast.2023.03.001
Zhu ZYao YSun JLi HLiu YKrause ABrunskill ECho KEngelhardt BSabato SScarlett J(2023)Weak proxies are sufficient and preferable for fairness with missing sensitive attributesProceedings of the 40th International Conference on Machine Learning10.5555/3618408.3620230(43258-43288)Online publication date: 23-Jul-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3618408.3620230
Ast FGeorge WKamalova JSharma AAouidef Y(2023)Decentralized justice: state of the art, recurring criticisms and next-generation research topicsFrontiers in Blockchain10.3389/fbloc.2023.12040906Online publication date: 9-Oct-2023
https://doi.org/10.3389/fbloc.2023.1204090
Burrell NSchoenebeck GLeyton-Brown KSamuelson LHartline J(2023)Measurement Integrity in Peer Prediction: A Peer Assessment Case StudyProceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/3580507.3597744(369-389)Online publication date: 9-Jul-2023
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Cummings RElzayn HPountourakis EGkatzelis VZiani J(2023)Optimal Data Acquisition with Privacy-Aware Agents2023 IEEE Conference on Secure and Trustworthy Machine Learning (SaTML)10.1109/SaTML54575.2023.00023(210-224)Online publication date: Feb-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/SaTML54575.2023.00023
Himmelstein MBudescu DHan Y(2023)The Wisdom of Timely CrowdsJudgment in Predictive Analytics10.1007/978-3-031-30085-1_8(215-242)Online publication date: 3-Jun-2023
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30085-1_8
Atanasov PHimmelstein M(2023)Talent Spotting in Crowd PredictionJudgment in Predictive Analytics10.1007/978-3-031-30085-1_6(135-184)Online publication date: 3-Jun-2023
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Kong YLi YZhang YHuang ZWu JKoyejo SMohamed SAgarwal ABelgrave DCho KOh A(2022)Eliciting thinking hierarchy without a priorProceedings of the 36th International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems10.5555/3600270.3601239(13329-13341)Online publication date: 28-Nov-2022
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Gordon MBishop MChen YDreber AGoldfedder BHolzmeister FJohannesson MLiu YTran LTwardy CWang JPfeiffer T(2022)Forecasting the publication and citation outcomes of COVID-19 preprintsRoyal Society Open Science10.1098/rsos.2204409:9Online publication date: 28-Sep-2022
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