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Network externalities in software systems

Editor: Carl F. Cargill Authors:

Giancarlo Succi,

Paolo Predonzani,

Andrea Valerio,

Tullio VernazzaAuthors Info & Claims

StandardView, Volume 6, Issue 4

Pages 185 - 191

https://doi.org/10.1145/338183.338194

Published: 01 December 1998 Publication History

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Published In

StandardView Volume 6, Issue 4

Dec. 1998

57 pages

ISSN:1067-9936

EISSN:1557-7376

DOI:10.1145/338183

Editor:
Carl F. Cargill
Sun Microsystems, Inc., Palo Alto, CA

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 01 December 1998

Published in STANDARDVIEW Volume 6, Issue 4

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Optimal auctions with positive network externalities

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