research-article

Security Analysis of Fountain V1

Authors:

Matthew Beighton,

Harry Bartlett,

Leonie SimpsonAuthors Info & Claims

ACSW '20: Proceedings of the Australasian Computer Science Week Multiconference

Article No.: 6, Pages 1 - 8

https://doi.org/10.1145/3373017.3373023

Published: 04 February 2020 Publication History

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Abstract

This paper analyses the security of the lightweight cryptographic algorithm Fountain (V1), which is a candidate in the current NIST competition for such ciphers. We examine the Boolean functions used in Fountain for state update and output. We show that correlations exist between S-box functions and some register stages that may lead to correlation attacks if certain update functions are detectable. We also show that the state update function avoids state convergence in any phase of cipher operation, but state collisions may be forced in one bit position, for select states, by manipulating the associated data or plaintext.

References

[1]

NIST. 2019. Lightweight Cryptography. NIST Information Technology Laboratory, CSRC, Lightweight Cryptography, Round 1 Candidates (2019). https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Lightweight-Cryptography/Round-1-Candidates

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[2]

Raluca Posteuca. 2019. Related-Key Differential Slide Attack Against Fountain V1. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2019/920(2019). https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/920

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[3]

Christian Rechberger and Elisabeth Oswald. 2004. Stream ciphers and side-channel analysis. In In ECRYPT Workshop, SASC-The State of the Art of Stream Ciphers. Citeseer, 320–326.

Google Scholar

[4]

Bin Zhang. 2019. Fountain: A Lightweight Authenticated Cipher (v1). NIST Lightweight Cryptography Competition 1 (2019).

Google Scholar

Security Analysis of Fountain V1
1. Security and privacy
  1. Cryptography

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ACSW '20: Proceedings of the Australasian Computer Science Week Multiconference

February 2020

367 pages

ISBN:9781450376976

DOI:10.1145/3373017

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

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Published: 04 February 2020

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ACSW '20

ACSW '20: Australasian Computer Science Week 2020

February 4 - 6, 2020

VIC, Melbourne, Australia

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Overall Acceptance Rate 61 of 141 submissions, 43%

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Abstract

References

Recommendations

Security analysis of Khudra: a lightweight block cipher for FPGAs

Security Analysis of GFN: 8-Round Distinguisher for 4-Branch Type-2 GFN

Security analysis of SIMECK block cipher against related-key impossible differential

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